6. In actual fact, the only stage in the procedure whic h should take prec eden ce over the determination of the Cour t's jurisdiction is the rece ipt and registration of the application by the Registry, after ensuring that its contents comp ly with the provisions of Rule 34 of the Rules of Cour t. Receiving the application shou ld not howe ver be equated to the admissibility of the application which lies within the jurisdiction of the Court and is therefore considered later by the latter, pursuant to Article 56 of the Char ter and Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. 7. In the light of the abov e considerations , the Court ough t to and should in future dispo se of its jurisdiction before dealing with the appli cation submitted for consideration, exce pt coge nt reasons exist for it to deviate from that normal proc edur e. 11. Dete rmin ing the ratione temporis juris dicti on of the Cou rt 8. On the jurisdiction of the Cour t, the Responde nt State had challenged the ratione temporis jurisdiction of the Court, drawn from the fact that the alleged violation (prohibition of indep ende nt candidates in presidenti al, legislative and local elections) occurred, in its case , befo re the entry into force of the Protocol establishing the Court (paragraph 80(3) of the judgment). 9. As stated in the judg men t of the Court, the 2nd Appl icant objects to the abov e submissions of the Resp onde nt as follows : " ... a distinction has to be made between normative and institutional provisions. The rights sought to be protected were enshrined in the Charter to which Respondent was already a party at the time of the alleged violation; although the Proto col came into operation later, it was merely a mechanism to protect those rights . The Char ter sets out rights while the Protocol provides an institutional framework for enforcement of those rights. The Applicant stated that it is not the ratification of the Protocol that establishes the rights , rather these rights existed in the Charter and the Respondent has violated them and contin ues to do so. The issue of retroactivity therefore does not arise" (italics adde d) (Paragraph 81(3)). 10. Relying appa rentl y on those arguments of the 2ndAppl icant to coun ter that objection, the Cour t dismissed it nota bly on the two grounds set out below: « The rights alleged to be violated are protected under the Charter. By the time of the alleged violat ion, the Respondent had already ratified the Charter and was therefore bound by it. The Charter was operational and there was therefore a duty on the Respondent as at the time of the alleged violation to protect those rights. At the time the Protocol was ratified by the Respondent and when it came into operation in the respect of the Respondent, the alleged violation was continuing and is still continuing: