specific obligation on the Contracting States to provide a redress for wrongs or damage prior to their ratification of the Convention.. (see §38) 125. Likewise, it follows from the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court contained in the aforementioned Judgment that “acts of a continuous or permanent nature last for as long as the fact continues, thus maintaining its lack of compliance with the international obligation remains” and “the Court may examine and rule on other alleged violations, which are based on facts that occurred or persisted” from the date of recognition of its jurisdiction by the State. (see §18) 126. In a similar way, the jurisprudence of the European Court understands that “the Court can even take into account facts prior to ratification, provided that they can be considered as the origin of a continuous situation that lasted beyond that date, or that are relevant to understand facts that occurred after that date.” (See KURIC AND OTHERS V. SLOVENIA – GC §240 -241) 127. Also according to the understanding of the European Court, “the bodies of the Convention admit the extension of the scope of jurisdiction ratione temporis, to situations of continuous violations that began before the entry into force of the Convention, but which continue after that date”. (SEE ECtHR in the case BECKER V. BELGIUM, Application No. 214/5) 128. Also with the same understanding, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in determining its temporal jurisdiction over cases of alleged human rights violations that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Protocol on the Court or the declaration by which Respondent States accept the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of applications made under Article 34 (6) of the Protocol, in the case of BENEFICIARIES OF NORBERT ZONGO AND OTHERS V. BURKINA FASO, (see Application No. 013/2011, Ruling of June 21, 2013 in Law Report, Vol. I, 2006-2016, page 197), noted that: 63 “(…) the relevant 22