120. This norm of the aforementioned Convention enshrines the principle
of non-retroactivity of the conventions, determining the ratione temporis
jurisdiction.
121. And the relevant date for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction by
reason of time is, in principle, the date of entry into force of the
Convention and its Protocols, as regards the respective contracting
parties. (See European Court of Human Rights (THDH) in the case SILIH
V. SLOVENIA (GC §164)
122. In fact, in the same sense, the Inter-American Court decided in the
case GOMES LUND AND OTHERS (“GUERRILLA DO ARAGUAIA”)
VS. BRAZIL, JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 24, 2010, by establishing that
“In order to determine whether or not it entertains jurisdiction to hear a
case or one of its aspects, in accordance with Article 62.1 of the American
Convention, the Court must take into consideration the date of
recognition of jurisdiction by the State, the terms in which this
recognition was granted and the principle of non-retroactivity, provided
for in article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”
123. This Court concluded that “the Court would have jurisdiction for the
acts subsequent to this recognition”. It also pointed out that, “Based on
the foregoing and on the principle of non-retroactive effect, the Court
cannot exercise its contentious jurisdiction to apply the Convention and
declare a violation of its norms when the alleged facts or the conduct of
the State, which could imply its international responsibility, are prior to
this recognition of jurisdiction.” (see §16)
124. In the same sense, the European Court (ECHR) concluded in the case
KOPECKY V. SLOVAKIA (GC) that competence ratione temporis covers
only the period after ratification of the Convention or its Protocols by the
Respondent State, by reaffirming that “(…) the Convention imposes no
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