adhere to the ordinary meaning of the of words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further" 50. In 1992, Lord Griffiths, in Pepper v. Hart (1993), All ER 42 at 50 stated: "The days have long passed when the Court adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The Court now adopts a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and is prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was enacted. In Stradling versus Morgan, a restrictive interpretation of statute was adopted, whereas, in Heydon's case, extensive interpretation was applied to give way for other interpretations." 51. In Beck v. Smith, Park B (as he then was) said: "It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the word used and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself." 52. The contracting parties to the Protocol are the Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Court is to collect from the nature of the subject, from the words and from the context of the Protocol, the true intent of the contracting parties, when the provisions of a statute are apt and clear. 53. Would a reasonable man say from reading Article 9(3) of the Protocol that the nationals are prima facie excluded from institutingproceedings against Member States? Strictly speaking, when the meaning of the Treaty is clear, it is applied not interpreted. Interpretation is a secondary process which only comes into play when it is impossible to make sense of the plain terms of the Treaty, or when they are susceptible of different meanings. 54. The context of the Article in question, as a whole, being so clear even though giving effect to the words used in their natural and ordinary sense, that is Fitzmaurice principles No. 2 stated in the preceding paragraph, the Contracting parties in our view envisaged only Member States, despite what may look like being harsh on individuals or nationals of the Community. 55. The Court is not here to change the provision of the Protocol but to apply it when it is clear or interpret it when it is abstruse and ambiguous. The Applicant from his application is raising a serious claim touching on free movement and free movement of goods and his rights to challenge an infringement upon his person. 56. What the Applicant's counsel is asking us in the given circumstance relates to his urging us to adopt not a narrower purposive approach, but to hold that the provision if applied as it is would exclude him from pursuing his case before this Court. His reference to Article 9 (1) of the Protocol which has bearing with Article 164 of the Statute of Court of Justice of the European Communities is a general provision which activist judges apply to shape a Statute to define the role of the Court very broadly in the interest of justice. Article 164 provides that "the Court of justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty, the law is observed." The Court has applied this provision to extend its review on jurisdiction to cover bodies which were not listed in the Treaty. The provision has also been used to fill in gaps in Treaties but some of the decisions attracted criticisms. We therefore do not want to tow the same line. 57. On the application of equity, the Court commented generally on the is a point supra and in addition the Court now holds that the application of le to the principles of equity in the sphere of international law is unclear. In Cases and Materials on International Law by Martin Dixon & Robert McCorquodale page 45, it is observed that: "The fact that tribunals often invoke equity does not necessarily mean that equity is a formal source of law and that it is desirable to apply equity. As stated in Hansbury and Martin on Modern Equity 16th Edition by Jill E. Martin page 27 "Clearly equity may not depart from statute law ...save in exceptional circumstances" 58. Consequently, the Court rejects the arguments on the application of equity in the instant case for the reasons stated herein. The Grounds for the Decision The Decision of the Court 59. The counsel to the Applicant contended that this Court has jurisdiction him to hear the substantive case on the ground of the peculiar nature of the suit wherein the Applicant instituted proceedings against his 6