overarching rationale for statutes of limitations, such as the time limit of Article 30 (2) of the EAC Treaty, is to protect the system from the prejudice of stale claims and their salutary effect on the twin principles of legal certainty and of repose (namely: affording peace of mind, avoiding the disruption of disruption of settled expectations, and reducing uncertainty about the future) — see TYLER T. OCHO and ANDREW J. WISTRICH’S article: The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitations, 28 Pac. L.J. 453, 460 (1997), quoted in JEFFREY R. BOLES’ article (supra) at p.255, footnote 37. Time limits provide predictability both to the litigants and to society at large — see Dogett v US, 505 US, 647, 665-66 (1992). CONCLUSION 59. The Court finds the Respondents’ argument that when the act complained of is a continuous detention, the starting date for computation of its limitation time is the day when it ceases is erroneous. It is erroneous in terms of the East African Community Treaty, and of the economic and social interests of the Community. Moreover, the principle of legal certainty requires strict application of the time-limit in Article 30 (2) of the Treaty. Furthermore, nowhere does the Treaty provide any power to the Court to extend, to condone, to waive, or to modify the prescribed time limit for any reason (including for “ continuing violations”). 60. In light of all these considerations, the Court concludes (1) that the starting date of an act complained of under Article 30 (2) (including the detention of a complainant), is not the day the act ends, but the day it is first effected; (2) that the Respondents in the instant case filed their Reference out of the prescribed time; and (3) that,consequently, the underlying Reference to this appeal is time barred for not complying with the provisions of Article 30 (2) of the Treaty. In the result: 1. This appeal is hereby allowed. 21