57 on behalf of Iran, for the Iranian authorities had not specifically instructed them to perform those acts. 160 Nevertheless, Iran was held internationally responsible for failing to prevent the attack on the United States’ diplomatic premises and subsequently to put an end to that attack. 161 Later on, the Iranian authorities formally approved and endorsed the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of the United States nationals by the militants and even went so far as to order the students not to put an end to that occupation. At this stage, according to the Court, the militants became de facto agents of the Iranian State and their acts became internationally attributable to that State. 162 134. The same approach was adopted in 1986 by the International Court itself in Nicaragua with regard to the UCLAs (which the Court defined as “persons of the nationality of unidentified Latin American countries”). 163 For specific internationally wrongful acts of these “persons” to be imputable to the United States, it was deemed necessary by the Court that these persons not only be paid by United States organs but also act “on the instructions” of those organs (in addition to their being supervised and receiving logistical support from them). 164 159 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1980), pp. 3 ff. The Court stated the following: “No suggestion has been made that the militants, when they executed their attack on the Embassy, had any form of official status as recognised ‘agents’ or organs of the Iranian State. Their conduct in mounting the attack, overrunning the Embassy and seizing its inmates as hostages cannot, therefore, be regarded as imputable to that State on that basis. Their conduct might be considered as itself directly imputable to the Iranian State only if it were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the militants acted on behalf of the State, having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian State to carry out a specific operation. The information before the Court does not, however, suffice to establish with the requisite certainty the existence at that time of such a link between the militants and any competent organ of the State” (ibid., p. 30, para. 58; emphasis added). 161 Ibid., pp. 30-33 (paras. 60-68). 162 The Court stated the following: “The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting pressure on the United States Government was complied with by other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State. The militants, authors of the invasion and jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible […].” (ibid., p. 35, para. 74; emphasis added). 163 See Nicaragua, para. 75. 164 Ibid., para. 80. 160 Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999