Given the circumstances of the case, it will not suffice to demonstrate the mere existence of such conversations, as to having been tapped, so as to win one’s case; it must still be proved that the recorded conversations did indeed seriously affect the rights of the Applicant. The act of tapping telephone conversations is not in itself illegal. Several judicial systems admit the principle underlying it, for the purposes of the necessities of an inquiry. In such circumstances, one cannot criticise its mere application, but adduce evidence to the effect that at a given time of the procedure, the conditions under which it was applied violated the rights of the person targeted. Without that convincing requirement, without any proof of concrete violation, the Court would purely and simply be making pronouncements on the domestic legislations of the Member States, but to engage in such an exercise is contrary to the time-held case law of the Court. As held by the Court in its Judgment of 27 October 2008, in Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger: “… the Court … does not have the mandate to examine the laws of Member States in abstracto, but rather, to ensure the protection of the rights of individuals whenever such individuals are victims of violation of those rights which are recognised as theirs, and the Court does so by examining concrete cases brought before it.” (§60) In other words, the Applicant will be required to produce evidence which establish that wrongful acts were committed against him, and that such violation must have occurred in relation to the contentious recorded conversations. It is only on that condition that one may assert that the admission of the recorded conversations formed part of the procedure, and that such admission harmed the rights of Mr. Djibril Yipéné Bassolé. A direct and concrete violation would therefore be found. In the current state of affairs, no court process has been produced to clearly demonstrate that there is a link between the telephone conversations alleged to have been recorded and the criminal attributions made concerning the status of the Applicant. Furthermore, the Court has always held that it lacks the jurisdiction to interfere with the acts of trial judges in the domestic courts of Member States, except where such acts substantially affect the rights of a person. The Court has therefore had to decline the jurisdiction for examining certain measures of trial proceedings. In the Judgment of 7 October 2011 on Cheikh Abdoulaye Mbengue v. Republic of Mali, the Court was of the view that: “… the requests to re-open the judicial inquiry and annul the arrest warrant derive from the sphere of the 15