be restricted pursuant to law and order and therefore is not subject to a limitations analysis.22 They emphatically deny that the case concerns freedom to manifest religion. The argument is that the free practice of religion is limited to voluntary manifestation of religion as opposed to involuntary compliance with requirements of the State. They specifically implore the Commission to “deal with the violation in question as a violation of the unrestricted freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and not to delve into the analysis of whether the state’s limitations are in accordance with law and order.” 135. Notably, when the Respondent State presented its observations on the merits, it was clearly responding to the case that the conduct complained of implicates the freedom of religion reserved to the forum externum. Procedurally, the Complainant’s rejoinder under Rule 108(2) of the Rules of Procedure should not raise new issues or refocus the case in such a way that the demands of fair hearing necessitate that the Respondent State should provide further observations on the new issues or new arguments. In turn, this would unnecessarily escalate the rounds of submissions from the parties and impact the efficient and speedy adjudication of complaints. 136. However, in the present case the Commission considers that the Respondent State provides enough material in its submissions on which the Commission can determine the matter despite the Complainants’ shift. In this regard, the Commission will consider the specific state conduct complained of and determine whether it engages the freedom of religion reserved to the forum internum or that reserved to the forum externum. The Commission will not be constrained by the Complainants’ submission that this case concerns only the freedom of religion within the forum internum. 137. Regarding the measures complained of, the Complainants’ argument as reformulated in the rejoinder is that the requirements to disclose religious identity and to falsely identify with one of the three recognised religions, under pain of not being issued with such crucial documents if one does not comply, entail that the victims and Baha’is generally were coerced to disclose religious affiliation and further, to falsely declare adherence to a religion they do not actually hold. They also submit that the refusal to accept birth certificates unless they bore “Muslim” as the religion of the bearer amounted to coercion to change religion. 138. Undoubtedly, a requirement to disclose one’s religious affiliations or risk not being issued with critical documents such as an ID with all the adverse consequences in one’s civil life amounts to coercion on the fair assumption that individuals do not 22 See para. 117 above 25