1990 - Amendment No. 10] (5) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is in contravention of section 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 or 22 and the court decides, as a result of hearing the parties, that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in section 16(7), 17(2), 19(5), 20(2) and (4), 21(3) or 22(3)(a) to (e), as the case may be, as are relied upon by the other party without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule nisi calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be in contravention of the section concerned. (6) If in any proceedings it falls to be determined whether any law is in contravention of the Declaration of Rights, the Attorney-General shall be entitled to be heard by the court on that question and if in any such proceedings any law is determined by the court to be in contravention of the Declaration of Rights, then, whether or not he has exercised his right to be heard in those proceedings, the Attorney-General shall have the like right with respect to an appeal from that determination as if he had been a party to the proceedings. (7) Where any law is held by a competent court to be in contravention of the Declaration of Rights, any person detained in custody under that law shall be entitled as of right to make an application to the Supreme Court for the purpose of questioning the validity of his further detention, notwithstanding that he may have previously appealed against his conviction or sentence or that any time prescribed for the lodging of such an appeal may have expired. [Subsection as amended by section 9 of Act 15 of 1990 - Amendment No. 10] (8) A written law may confer upon the Supreme Court powers additional to those conferred by this section for the purpose of enabling the Supreme Court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section. [Subsection as amended by section 13 of Act 25 of 1981 - Amendment No. 2] of its Constitution which provides the course of action to be taken where there are allegations human rights violations. The State adds that there is no evidence to prove that the Complainant pursued local remedies. The State further indicates that in terms of Zimbabwe law, where one is engaged in acts that violate the rights of another person, that other person can obtain an interdict from the court restraining the violator from such act. 33. On the effectiveness of local remedies, the State submits that the Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary in the exercise of its mandate in conformity with both the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary × http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/indjudiciary.htm , and the African Commission's Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Aid in Africa × http://achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../resolutions/resolution46_en.html . 34. The State dismisses the Complainant's argument that his case is similar to those brought by Sir Dawda Jawara against the Republic of The Gambia, and Rights International (on behalf of Charles Baridorn Wiza) against the Federal Republic of Nigeria, adding that in the latter cases, there was proof of real threat to life. The State goes further to indicate instances where the government has implemented court decisions that went against it, adding that even in the present case involving the Complainant, the government respected the Court's decision. 35. The State further indicates that in terms of Zimbabwe law, it is not a legal requirement for a Complainant to be physically present in the country in order to access local remedies, adding that, both the High Court Act (Chapter 7:06) and the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 7:05) permit any person to make an application to either court through his/her lawyer. The State adds that in the Ray Choto and Mark Chavhunduka case, the victims were tortured by state agents and they applied for compensation while they were both in the United Kingdom, and succeeded in their claim. The State concludes that the Complainant is not barred from pursuing remedies in a similar manner. 36. The State also argues that the communication does not comply with Article 56(6) of the Charter which provides that a communication should be lodged within a reasonable time after exhaustion of local remedies, but where Complainant realises that local remedies shall be unduly prolonged he/she must submit the complaint to the Commission immediately. According to the State, although the Charter does not specify what constitutes a reasonable time, the Commission should get inspiration from the other jurisdictions, including the Inter-American Commission which has fixed six months as reasonable time, adding that even the draft protocol merging the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights provides for a six months period. 37. The State concludes its submissions by noting that 'no cogent reasons have been given for the failure to pursue local remedies or remedies before the Commission within a reasonable time' and as such the 4