afforded an opportunity to pronounce themselves on possible human rights breaches. This is because the alleged human rights violations form part of the bundle of rights and guarantees that were related to or were the basis of the proceedings before domestic courts. In such a situation it would, therefore, be unreasonable to require the Applicants to lodge a new application before the domestic courts to seek relief for such claims.19 55. The Court observes that the claim of the right to a fair trial impacts on the realisation of various rights alleged by the Applicant under the bundle of fair trial rights. 56. In light of this, the Court observes that the Respondent State had the opportunity to address the possible human rights breaches before the domestic courts. 57. Regarding the filing of an application for review at the Court of Appeal, the Court has already held that within the Respondent State’s judicial system, this is an extraordinary remedy which applicants are not required to exhaust before filing their applications before this Court.20 58. Consequently, the Court holds that the Applicant has exhausted local remedies as envisaged under Article 56(5) of the Charter and Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules and therefore, it dismisses the Respondent State’s objection. 19 Jibu Amir alias Mussa and Another v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (28 November 2019) 3 AfCLR 629, § 37; Alex Thomas v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (20 November 2015) 1 AfCLR 465, §§ 60-65, Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Another v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (28 September 2017) 2 AfCLR 65, § 54; Ernest Karatta, Walafried Millinga, Ahmed Kabunga and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (30 September 2021) 1 AfCLR 356, § 57. 20 Alex Thomas v. Tanzania, op. cit., §§ 63-65; Mohamed Abubakari v. Tanzania (merits) op cit., §§ 6670; Christopher Jonas v. Tanzania (merits), § 44. 16