Communication 341/07 - Equality Now v Ethiopia the differential treatment but demonstrate that the differential treatment was objectively and reasonably justifiable.20 149. In the present Communication, the Complainant contends that the abduction and rape by the private individual, and the failures of the Respondent State to protect Ms Negash's rights by preventing the abduction and rape and by sanctioning the acts as a remedy amount to discrimination contrary to Article 2 of the Charter. In contending so, the Complainant does not identify the comparator. In other words, the Complainant does not identify a similarly situated person who was accorded the necessary protection by the Respondent State or accorded justice for violations similar to those suffered by Ms Negash. It is not possible in the circumstances to identify the differentiation or distinction which is the gravamen of discrimination. Not all violence against women necessarily amounts to or ought to be termed "discrimination" to be condemned as violations of women's rights. In this respect this Communication can be distinguished from Communication 323/06 - Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTER1GHTS v Egypt in which the Commission found that there was no evidence to show that male demonstrators received the same treatment as the female demonstrators at whom violent sexual abuse was directed. 150. In the circumstances, it is difficult to find that the Respondent State distinctively failed to protect Ms Negash's rights by preventing the abduction and rape as compared to others similarly situated. Similarly, the Respondent State's failure to act diligently and render justice to Ms Negash for the violations she suffered cannot be considered as differential in the absence of a comparator. The Commission is accordingly indisposed to affirm that there was discrimination. For purposes of the present case, it is sufficient that the failures of the Respondent State amount to violations of a name other than "discrimination" as established above with respect to the rights under Article 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(1 )(a) of the Charter. The Commission does not also find it necessary to separately examine the alleged violation of Article 18(3) of the Charter as it was invoked in respect of discrimination and other rights which have already been confirmed to have been violated. 151. As to the appropriate remedial measures, the Commission notes the Complainant's prayer as stated at paragraph 15 above. The Commission considers that the acts committed against Ms Negash were instantaneous. The impugned acts did not engage a continuing failure on the part of the State to give effect to the rights of Ms Negash. Had they been of such a nature, it would have been necessary to require the Respondent State to ensure the cessation of the acts with respect to Ms Negash.