4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases. 5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant. , among others, exclude persons who are less than 18 years from the limitation of the right to life, even legally, from the imposition of the death penalty. A similar protection is guaranteed by Article 37(9) [sic!] 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which stipulates that Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without the possibility of release shall be handed down for offences committed by persons below 18 years . Needless to strive for the interpretation in order to observe that the very act of imposing such sentences against juveniles constitutes an arbitrary interference in the right to life and the integrity of these persons, an act which is prohibited by Article 4 of the African Charter. 72. In this particular instance, the State does not dispute the fact that the death penalty was actually handed down to the victims whereas they were juveniles. Even though the State shows proof that the capital punishments were subsequently commuted to lesser penalties, the fact is that this measure will not change the established reality of a violation of a right to life by the imposition of this penalty. As per the decision in Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria cited above, the Commission recalls that the adoption of alternative measures sequel to the violation cannot be used as an excuse by the State. Based on these considerations, the Commission concludes that Article 4 of the Charter was violated, that is when a cross review is carried out in relation to Article 60 of the Charter. 73. Though the violation of the right to life has been noted, the parties still do not agree on the enforcement of the sentence in the case of Joseph Kasongo only a few minutes after the sentence was imposed. Though the Complainants do not provide any proof of its enforcement, the Respondent State could also not prove that having been sentenced and the ruling commuted; Joseph Kasongo served his term in a State institution. The Commission however notes that this Communication mainly alleges the delivery of a death penalty against individuals below 18 years and not on the execution of the sentences handed down. There is no doubt that only the sentencing of Joseph Kasongo to capital punishment, which has not been contested by the Respondent State, is relevant in this case. The violation of Article 4 of the African Charter noted above consequently applies to Joseph Kasongo. 74. In respect of Articles 7(1)(a) and (c) of the Charter, the violation of which is specifically alleged by the Complainants, their provisions stipulate that: 1. Every individual shall have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulation and customs in force; (c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice. 75. With regard to Article 7(1)(a) , the Commission refers to its Directives and Principles on the Right to a Fair Hearing in Africa to recall that even though the principle of second hearing has not become an obligation under international law, the fact still remains that it is ones right to be given a fair hearing. 17 Similarly, the gravity of the sentences handed down may render the availability of a second hearing necessary for an efficient administration of justice. This applies therefore to instances where the court judgment is the death penalty or life imprisonment. 18 76. From established jurisprudence, the Commission considers the right of appeal against a judicial decision as a fundamental aspect of the rights to a fair trial. The Commission affirms such a position in Womens Legal Aid Center (on behlf of Moto) v. Tanzania 19 but also more significantly in the famous decision in International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v. Nigeria dealing specifically with arbitrary deprivation of an inviolable right to life enshrined in Article 4 of the African Charter. 20 12