other premises. We say nothing more, as we do not wish to enter the debate referred to in paragraph 1 above. 3. SECONDLY, regarding the merits, we would, while agreeing with the outcome of the majority judgment, have in some respects approached the matter differently and also framed the Orders differently. 4. Having found that the application is admissible and that the Court has jurisdiction, we would zoom onto the crisp question in the matter: are the Burkinabe laws in terms of which the Applicant was convicted of defamation, namely, Articles 109 and 110 of the Information Code, and Article 178 of the Penal Code, in conflict with Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and other instruments relied upon and cited by the Applicant? ln · our view, the answer is in the affirmative. As presently framed, the above legislative measure are, for the reasons set out in the majority judgment, an unjustified restriction to the right of freedom of expression; that is, criminalization of defamation is not justified. If such criminalization can be justified under certain circumstances, such as prohibiting for example hate speech or incitement, the above legislative measures, as they currently read, are too broad and problematic. It must be mentioned though, that the possible excerptions referred to are more theoretical than real. This is because once a so-called criminal defamation amounts to say hate speech or incitement, it is no longer criminal defamation; it mutates into one of the already existing and well known specific crimes such as \( - ~~__) :s:i(">-"