situation however no longer arises in the modern era where there are established judicial fora for individuals to litigate civil wrongs. As pointed out by Lord Diplock in the case of Gleaves v. Deakin, [1980] AC 477 (at page 482-483). “The original justification for the emergence of the common law offence of defamatory libel in a more primitive age was the prevention of disorder… The reason for creating the offence was to provide the victim with the means of securing the punishment of his defamer by peaceful process of the law instead of resorting to personal violence to obtain revenge. But risk of providing breaches of the peace has ceased to be an essential element in the criminal offence of defamatory libel; and the civil action for damages for libel and on injunction provides protection for the reputation of the private citizen without the necessity for any interference by public authority with the alleged defamer’s right to freedom of expression.” The Zimbabwe Supreme Court in Nevanji Madanhire V. Attorney General, CCZ 2/14 unanimously held that the offence of defamation was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society within the contemplation of s 20(2) of the former Zimbabwe Constitution. In its words: “The harmful and undesirable consequences of criminalizing defamation, viz, the chilling possibilities of arrest, detention and two years imprisonment, are manifestly excessive in their effect. Moreover, there is an appropriate and satisfactory alternative civil remedy that is available to combat the mischief of defamation. Put differently, the offence of criminal defamation constitutes a disproportionate instrument for achieving the intended objective of protecting the reputations, right and freedoms of other persons. In short, it is not necessary to criminalize defamatory statement.” 34