2. Exclusion of the evidence obtained under duress 163. The Commission and the representatives indicated that “when” the victims “made their self-incriminating statements before the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judge of the Mina Judicial District[,] they were still suffering from the effects of fear, anguish and inferiority, given that only a few days had passed since their detention and physical mistreatment.” The Commission considered that the lack of “a serious, exhaustive and impartial investigation into the alleged acts of torture,” meant that “any possible flaws in the confessions rendered” could not be corrected “and therefore the State could not use those statements as evidence.” Furthermore, the Commission and the representatives pointed out that the practice of torture is reinforced by the legal validity granted to the first statement made by the accused, which was rendered before the Public Prosecutor’s Office and not before a court, added to which the Mexican courts gave validity to this statement. The representatives also pointed out that “the confessions of the victims should have been excluded from the criminal proceeding” and that their ratification of these statements before the court should not have been taken into account, given that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel “were still suffering from the effects of torture and threats and did not understand the significance or scope of that ratification.” 164. The State argued that the conviction “was not exclusively based on the confessions made by the accused.” It indicated that the trial judge “heard, assessed and corroborated all the evidence and records in the case file” and that if it were proven that the judgment "against the […] victims was based on the confession obtained under the circumstances described, this would result in the competent authority calling into question its evidentiary value and ruling according to the rest of the body of evidence and pursuant to the relevant law and then determining whether such a violation left the accused unprotected and affected the outcome of the ruling.” 165. In this respect, the Court notes that the rule of excluding from judicial proceedings all evidence obtained under torture or through cruel or inhumane treatment (hereinafter “exclusionary rule”) has been recognized by several international treaties 257 and international bodies for the protection of human rights, which consider that the rule of exclusion is intrinsic to the prohibition of such acts. 258 Therefore, the Court considers that this rule is absolute and irrevocable. 259 257 Article 15 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that “[E]ach State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.” Moreover, Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture indicates that “[N]o statement that is verified as having been obtained through torture shall be admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding, except in a legal action taken against a person or persons accused of having elicited it through acts of torture, and only as evidence that the accused obtained such statement by such means.” 258 In this regard, the Committee against Torture has pointed out that "the obligations in Articles 2 (whereby “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification of torture”) 15 (prohibiting confessions extorted by torture being admitted in evidence, except against the torturer), and 16 (prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) must be observed in all circumstances.” Cf. United Nations. Committee against Torture. General Comment N° 2, ‘Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties’ of January 24, 2008 (CAT/C/GC/2) para. 6. Furthermore, the Committee on Human Rights has stated that: “The guarantees of fair trial may never be made subject to measures of derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights. (…) no statements or confessions or, in principle, other evidence obtained in violation of this provision may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered by Article 14, including during a state of emergency, except if a statement or confession obtained in violation of Article 7 is used as evidence that torture or other treatment prohibited by this provision occurred. ”United Nations. Committee on Human Rights. General comment No. 32: Right to a fair trial and to equality before courts and tribunals (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I), para.6. 65