Convention,” 81 so that they have a full understanding of the Convention’s regulatory content derived from the interpretation of the Inter-American Court, as the “final interpreter” of the Inter-American corpus juris. IV. DIFFUSE CONVENTIONALITY CONTROL BY MEXICAN JUDGES 64. The abovementioned features of the jurisprudential doctrine of “diffuse conventionality control” apply to the Mexican judicial system. To date, this doctrine has been reiterated in four cases regarding complaints against the Mexican State: Rosendo Radilla Pacheco v. the United Mexican States (2009); 82 Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico (2010); 83 Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico (2010); 84 and Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico (2010). 85 65. Given that the United Mexican States signed the American Convention on Human Rights (1981) and accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court (1998), these international judgments are binding, 86 and take on a “definitive and unappealable” character. 87 Therefore, Mexico cannot invoke any domestic provision or jurisprudential principle as justification for not complying with the Convention, since international treaties are binding upon the States Parties and their provisions must be complied with, under the terms of Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 88 also signed by Mexico. 66. Thus, “diffuse conventionality control” means that all Mexican judges and organs linked to the administration of justice at all levels of the Judiciary, regardless of their rank, grade or area of expertise, are required, ex officio, to examine the compatibility between domestic actions and provisions and those of the American Convention on Human Rights, its Additional Protocols (and other international instruments), as well as the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, creating a “block of conventionality” under the terms analyzed. 89 This is so because: 90 (…)it is not only the suppression or issue of domestic legal provisions that guarantee the rights contained in the American Convention, in accordance with the obligation established in Article 2 thereof. The State must also develop practices leading to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention. Consequently, the existence of a 81 Art. 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 82 Supra note 19, para. 338 to 342. 83 Supra note 22, para. 233 to 238. 84 Supra note 23, para. 218 to 223. 85 Supra note 27, para. 225 to 235. 86 Article 68 (1) of the American Convention on Human Rights: “The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.” 87 Article 67 (1) of the American Convention on Human Rights: “The judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to appeal. […]” 88 See these standards supra notes 77 and 78. 89 Regarding the “block of conventionality” as a parameter for “diffuse conventionality control,” see supra para. 44 to 52 of this Concurring Opinion. 90 Case of Rosendo Radilla Pacheco v, supra note 19, para. 338; Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra note 22, para. 233; and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra note 23, para. 218. 23