executive, or judicial branches of the State, which is accountable as a whole and assumes international responsibility for any breaches of international instruments it has signed. As stated by García Ramírez: 27. For the purposes of the American Convention and the exercise of the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, the State is considered integrally, as a whole. Accordingly, responsibility is global, it involves the State as a whole and cannot be subject to the division of authority established in domestic law. At the international level, it is not possible to divide the State, to bring before the Court only one or some of its organs, to grant them representation of the State in the proceeding – without this representation affecting the whole State – and excluding other organs from this conventional system of responsibility, leaving their actions outside the “conventionality control” which is implied by the jurisdiction of the international court. 79 (Underlining added). 61. Thus, the judges of the States Parties to the Convention are also required to comply with the provisions of the Convention and the doctrine of “diffuse conventionality control” facilitates their task of interpreting national provisions (including the constitutional text) to ensure these conform to the Inter-American corpus juris and not applying those that are in absolute contravention of the aforementioned “block of conventionality”. In this way, they prevent the State from being internationally responsible for violating international human rights commitments. 62. “Diffuse conventionality control" is also based on Article 29 of the Pact of San Jose, inasmuch as all the powers and organs of the States that have signed this international instrument, including judges and bodies that administer justice and perform judicial functions, are required, through their interpretations, to allow the broadest possible enjoyment and exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention and its additional protocols (and in other international instruments under the aforementioned terms). 80 This, in turn, implies making restrictive interpretations whenever these treaties are being limited, always based on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court. 63. From Article 68(1) it is clear that States Parties to the Pact of San Jose “are committed to compliance with the Court’s decisions in all cases to which they are parties.” This cannot limit the task of ensuring that the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence has “direct effectiveness” in all national States that have expressly recognized its jurisdiction, regardless of whether it concerns a matter in which they have not participated formally as a "material party.” Given that the Inter-American Court is the international judicial body of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, whose essential function is to apply and interpret the Convention, its interpretations acquire the same degree of effectiveness as the text of the Convention. In other words, the conventional provisions which States must apply are the result of interpretations of the provisions of the Pact of San Jose (and its additional protocols, as well as other international instruments). The interpretations issued by the Inter-American Court have two purposes: (i) to ensure the Convention’s effectiveness in the particular case with subjective effects, and (ii) to establish general effectiveness with the effects of interpreted standards. Hence, the logic and necessity that the ruling - aside from being notified to the State party in the specific dispute - also be ”transmitted to the State Parties to the 79 note 11. 80 Cf. para. 27 of his Concurring Opinion in the Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, supra Cf. supra para. 44 to 52 in his Concurring Opinion. 22