continued incarceration may only lead to further violations to occur and not releasing him would have devastating consequences that no amount of pecuniary damages could remedy. 162. The Respondent State submits that the Applicant should serve his time for the crime as he was duly sentenced by domestic courts. The Respondent State further submits that the Applicant did not provide any specific or compelling circumstance to substantiate his request to be released and that he is, as such, not entitled to the relief sought especially because he committed the offence. *** 163. With respect to the prayer that the conviction be quashed and the sentence set aside, the Court reiterates its position that it is not an appellate court as it does not operate within the same judicial system as national courts; and does not apply the same law." This Court cannot therefore entertain the Applicant's prayer. 164. Regarding the prayer for release, the Court refers to its established case law where it held that a measure such as the release of the Applicant can only be ordered in special or compelling circumstances. 48 The Court is of the view that such circumstances are to be determined in casu bearing in mind mainly proportionality between the measure of restoration sought and the extent of the violation established. Determination must be done with the ultimate purpose of upholding fairness and preventing double jeopardy.49 As such, the procedural violation that underpins the request for a particular relief has to have fundamentally affected domestic processes to warrant such a request. See Application No. 027/2015. Judgment of 21/09/18, Minani Evarisl v. United Republic of Tanzania, § 81; Mohamed Abuakari v. Tanzania, op. cit., §. 28. 48 See for instance, Alex Thomas v. Tanzania, op. cit., §. 157. 49 See Application No. 016/216. Judgment of 21109/18, Diocles Willian v. United Republic of Tanzania, § 101; Minani Evarisl v Tanzania, op. cit., §. 82; Loaysa-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, IACHR Series C No 33, [1997], §§. 83 and 84; Del Rio Prada v. Espagne, 42750/09 - Grand Chamber Judgment, [2013] ECHR 1004, §. 83; Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v. Cameroun (2000) AHRLR 57 (ACHPR 1997) operative provisions; and Communication No. 796/1998, Lloyd Reece v. Jamaica, Views under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, 21 July 2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/781D1796/1998, §. 9. 47 39