167. Regarding the above, in their pleadings and motions brief, the representatives argued that the continued existence of Decree Law No. 2,191 and article 15 of Law No. 19,992 also prevented the implementation of the investigation and the possibilities of claiming reparations. 168. They indicated that, in order to make this claim, an initial mechanism would be a “finance proceeding” (finance proceeding) against the State and, according to the representatives, this is an adequate, although ineffective, remedy to protect the “right to integral reparation.” They added that, of “numerous actions” of this kind in relation to crimes during the dictatorship, “only one has been successful,” and that “the reason usually mentioned by the Chilean courts to reject these actions is that they were time-barred under the statute of limitations, which is [four] years following the perpetration of the crime as established by article 2332 of the Civil Code.” 171 Regarding their above-mentioned assertion that “the Chilean courts” reject certain actions, they subsequently explained in their final arguments brief that it is “the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court that constantly […] rejects [claims for compensation for harm resulting from a crime that are not heard by the criminal courts], on the […] principle […] that the civil action as a result of crimes against humanity is subject to the statute of limitations.” They stated that, to the contrary, these claims “are generally admitted by the first instance courts or by the courts of appeal.” 169. The representatives indicated that another possible mechanism is to try and obtain reparation under criminal proceedings, “once they conclude with a sentence against the perpetrator and against the Treasury.” This mechanism is not effective either, owing “to the application of statutes of limitation and to the prescription of the civil action.” They also stated that, after 2007, the Supreme Court declared 27 claims for compensation admissible related to “crimes perpetrated during the military dictatorship” filed in the context of criminal proceedings. They indicated that, in this case, it is not possible to use this mechanism owing to the absence of an effective and adequate investigation of Mr. García Lucero’s torture and detention. 170. The representatives explained that they have been advising Mr. García Lucero since 1994, and that they have consulted “non-governmental organizations” that have “indicated that there was no possibility of making a criminal claim or filing a civil case,” so that they have “focus[ed] on assisting Mr. García Lucero obtain a pension in Chile [owing to his status as] ‘a person dismissed for political reasons.’” 171. The representatives explained that article 6 of Law No. 19,234, concerning “persons dismissed for political reasons” establishes that, if the “agreement” established in the law is reached, “the interested party […] shall waive any legal action.” Also, they indicated that Law No. 19,992, which established reparations for victims of “political imprisonment” and torture, “does not include similar norms,” so that “victims may make use of remedies that exist under Chilean law” to contest the reparation amount allocated by the said law. However, they noted that “this is not possible, because no judge of the Republic would be legitimated by the Constitution to review the legality of an amount established by law.” They stated that “[d]espite this, the possibility could be considered of using a constitutional remedy […] to allege that the amount of the reparation is insufficient.” In this regard, they 171 In addition, the Court notes that, in their final written arguments, the representatives themselves referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in which it indicated that the statute of limitations should be calculated as of the time that the illegal act had been proved. However, this is a recent judgment, of January 21, 2013, and the information provided by the representatives does not indicate the existence of another similar decision of the Supreme Court. The representatives related this decision to the “supposition” that, following the delivery of that judgment, “this line of jurisprudence would be maintained in the Treasury’s upcoming defense arguments.” In other words, they did not relate it to the alleged violations of rights prior to the delivery of the said judgment. 52