164. The representatives stated that, this “case does not […] relate to torture, but rather […] to access to justice and adequate reparation.” They indicated that “the denial of justice” did not occur merely in relation to the investigation, but also because of the absence of reparation, which should redress the harm integrally. They stated that “Mr. García Lucero has not received integral reparation for his torture, unlawful detention and exile, because the reparations received are not sufficient, were not provided promptly, and have not been effective. […] His wife and daughters have not been recognized as victims and have not received any type of reparation, among other reasons, because they live in exile.” Even though Mr. García Lucero and his family “recognize the efforts made by the State […] to make reparation to different victims of human rights violations during the military dictatorship, […] they consider that the different public policies […] have not provided adequate redress […] for the harm caused.” 170 165. The representatives noted that, “[a]t first sight,” the use of “reparations programs” seems to be “irreconcilable” with the “right of each individual to reparation for the harm suffered.” However, they indicated that “they can be reconciled, [… t]o the extent that a program […] includes different forms of reparation (and is not limited to just one such as compensation) [because] it gains in terms of complexity, but also in its possibility of recognizing and repairing the individual harm caused.” They indicated that “any program of reparations should be established based on the principle of non-discrimination.” They noted that “victims in the situation of Mr. García Lucero and [his wife…] do not have access to the PRAIS (health program) in the United Kingdom, while the surviving victims of torture who live in Chile, and their immediate families, do have access.” They considered that “[t]his differential treatment is unjustified.” In their brief with final arguments, they indicated that this “constitutes discriminatory treatment that violates Article 1(1) of the American Convention.” They stated that “[t]he right to adequate reparation […] cannot be conditioned […] on the victims living in the territory of the State which must provide reparation.” 166. They also indicated that “a fundamental element to link collective reparation and individual reparation” is that “the reparation of a collective nature or through reparation programs cannot take away from the victims their right to an effective and adequate remedy to argue that elements of the reparation program violate their right to integral reparation.” They pointed out that Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, as well as Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, oblige the State to ensure that victims of torture may file “civil actions […] to obtain integral reparation.” 170 They noted that Mr. García Lucero had received a payment as a victim of torture under Law No. 19,992 and also, based on other norms, a pension as “a person dismissed for political reasons” and a special payment with regard to the latter. In this regard, they considered that “[t]he lack of due diligence by Chile in the case of victims survivors of torture who were political prisoners is evident. Thus, it was only in 2004, […] 14 years after the return to democracy, […] that Chile had an administrative remedy to obtain some form of reparation.” They explained that, in addition to the bonus payment that Mr. García Lucero received, Law No. 19,992 established the possibility of the payment of a pension, but that, in order to receive it, Mr. García Lucero had to renounce other benefits provided by another law on “persons dismissed for political reasons,” which he chose not to do. Thus, as in the case of Mr. García Lucero, “[i]f the person who opted, because he was considered to be [“]a person dismissed for political reasons [”] (to keep his monthly pension) […] he would only have the right, as stipulated in article 2 of Law [No.] 19,992, to a single bonus payment of 3,000,000 Chilean pesos, equivalent to […] US$5,847.93 at December 17, 2004.” Regarding the pension as “a person dismissed for political reasons,” they stated that “the value of this pension is not sufficient to redress the pecuniary damage caused to him by the loss of his employment.” Moreover, the pension and the bonus payment received as “a person dismissed for political reasons” “are insufficient to redress the pecuniary damage resulting” from the denial of justice. In addition, if he collects these payments in Chile, Mr. García Lucero must pay the cost of the transaction and currency exchange, which would reduce the monthly amount of the pension to a risible sum. The representatives explained that Mr. García Lucero’s wife and their three daughters have also been victims, “owing to the non-pecuniary and patrimonial damage caused them as a result of the torture of their [husband and] father, and the subsequent denial of justice”; therefore, they all have the right to integral reparation. However, they have not received any redress. 51