O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 13 46. John Murray v. the United Kingdom (8 February 1996, Reports 1996-I) concerned, amongst other things, the drawing of inferences from a person’s silence during questioning and trial. The Court found that there was no doubt that “the right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 ... By providing the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aims of Article 6” (see John Murray, cited above, § 45). The Court saw two extremes. On the one hand, it was self-evident that it was incompatible with the immunities to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give evidence himself. On the other hand, the immunities could and should not prevent the accused’s silence from being taken into account in situations which clearly called for an explanation. The conclusion was that the “right to remain silent” was not absolute (ibid., § 47). In discussing the degree of compulsion in the case, the Court noted that the applicant’s silence did not amount to a criminal offence or contempt of court, and that silence could not, in itself, be regarded as an indication of guilt (ibid., § 48). The Court thus distinguished the case from Funke, where the degree of compulsion had, in effect, “destroyed the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination” (ibid., § 49). 47. The case of Saunders concerned the use at the applicant’s criminal trial of statements which had been obtained under legal compulsion under the Companies Act 1985. The domestic provisions required company officers to produce books and documents, to attend before inspectors and to assist inspectors in their investigation on pain of a fine or committal to prison for two years. The Court referred to the cases in John Murray and Funke, and found that the right not to incriminate oneself was primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. It did not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which had an existence independent of the will of the suspect, such as breath, blood and urine samples. The Court held that the question whether the use made by the prosecution of the statements obtained from the applicant by the inspectors under compulsion amounted to an unjustifiable infringement of the right “had to be examined in the light of all the circumstances of the case”: in particular, it had to be determined whether the applicant had been subjected to compulsion to give evidence and whether the use made of the resulting testimony offended the basic principles of a fair procedure under Article 6 § 1 (see Saunders, cited above, §§ 67 and 69). 48. The applicant in Serves (cited above) was called as a witness in proceedings in which he had initially been charged as an accused, although at the date of the witness summons and the subsequent proceedings the