held any personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality.” 126. It is obvious that the complaint of the Applicant has to do with the ‘objective test’, and in the immediate preceding cited case, the Court further held that: “As to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judge’s conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality. This implies that, in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge or a body sitting as a bench lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the person concerned is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified” 127. The Respondent proffered argument that the Chief Justice even though sat on previous matters relating to the impeachment of the Applicant, the cases were not heard on merit but were determined at the preliminary measure. The question then is whether those past judicial activities of the Chief Justice are capable of grounding the Applicant’s apprehension of fear of bias without any supportive factual circumstances. 128. In The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) case of THE PROSECUTOR v. JEAN-PAUL AKAYESU CASE NO. ICTR-96-4-A, JUDGMENT, 1 JUNE 2001 (AKAYESU APPEAL JUDGMENT), the Tribunal, in deciding on an appeal ground on impartiality held as follows: 51