“In determining whether there is a legitimate reason to fear that the judge lacked independence or impartiality, it is important to ascertain the standpoint of the accused and whether his doubts can be held to be objectively justified.” 124. The Applicant in this case, being an associate, and subordinate of the Chief Justice, the apprehension of fear of bias, ordinarily, should have emanated from the prosecutors in his trial but not him. However, he cited two main grounds for his alleged apprehension of bias against him by the Chief Justice; firstly, that the Chief Justice had previously been acquainted with one of the cases in which the Applicant had been implicated by the House for judicial impropriety at the Supreme Court; and secondly, since the initiation of the impeachment proceedings against him, the Chief Justice had pronounced on some applications at the instance of the Applicant. So, in the view of the Applicant, considering his previous roles, vis-à-vis the impeachment trial as a whole, the Chief Justice may not be an impartial judge for the trial of his case. 125. In the MORICE v. FRANCE - 29369/10 - Grand Chamber Judgment [2015] ECHR 407 (23 April 2015 the European Court of Human Rights gave a hint of what impartiality denotes when it held that: “The Court reiterates that impartiality normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias and its existence or otherwise can be tested in various ways. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 must be determined according to a subjective test where regard must be had to the personal conviction and behavior of a particular judge, that is, whether the judge 50