14 34. Such proof has, however, not been forthcoming from the Respondent State. That is what the Court ought to have expressed in a clea rer manner particularly with regard to the right to freely participate in the government of the country. Paragraphs I 09 in ji.ne, lll, 1J 3 and 114 of the Judgment indeed s uggest that the barring of independent candidates from certain elections and the correlative obligation to belong to a political party are in "themselves" vi o lations of Articles I 0 and 13 (l) of the Charter, whether or not such limitations are reasonable. The reasoning of the Court would had been cleare r if its various sequences and the conesponding paragraphs of the Judgment were positioned in a more coheren t manner so to show that it is the fact that the limitation to the rights concerned were unreasonable that led the Court to the conclusion that the said right.:; had been violated. Paragraph 109, in pa1iicular, is not at its right place in the reasoning of the Court (it should be located upstream) and Paragraph I 08, for part, addresses issues which are extraneous to the instant case. 35. Having found that Articles I 0 and 13 ( l) of the Charter had been violated, the Court could only have concluded that there was violation of the principles of non-discrimination and of the equal protection of the la w as enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 (2), respectively. 36. The principle of non-di scrimination, on one hand, and the pri nciples of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law, on the other, are in close relationship. They are so to say the two s ides of the same coin, the first principle being the corollary of the second on es. Their main difference under the A fi·ican Chatter lies in their respective scope.