9 and the issue of retroactivity that Tanzania raises is not relevant. And we would like to refer to what we have already argued that violation existed in the past, it continues to exist" (Public Hearing of 15 June 2012, Oral Hearing Verbatim Record, p. 13, lines 11 - 14). I 9. Since it had to ensure that it had jurisdiction to deal with the matter before it, the Court, as required, considered the merits of the 61h Preliminary objection of the Respondent, eve_n though it was raised belatedly, that is, during the second round of oral pleadings. 20. l am however of the view that in dea ling with this objection, the Court should have made a clearer di stinction between the obligations of the Respondent under the African Charter and its obligations under the Protocol and the optional declaration. The 2uu Applicant indeed mixed up these two kinds of obl igations (see Paragraph 81 (3) of the Judgment) and the Court should have lifted any ambiguity in thjs matter by clearly indicating that in the instant case its personal jurisdiction is solely based on the Protoco l and the optional declaration. 21. On the basis of the non-retroactivity of treaties, a well-established principle in international Jaw, the Court cannot be seized of allegations of violations of human and people's rights by an individual or by a nongovernmental organi zation unless such alleged vio lations occurred after the entry into force for the State concerned, not only of the African Charter but also of the Protocol and. more important, of the optional declaration; Article 34 (6) of the Protocol does not suffer any am biguity in this regard since it provides that "'the Court shall not receive any petition under Article 5 (3) in vo lving a State Party which has not made such a declaration''.