28. Here, the Applicant is the worker and the Defendants are the employers. In advancing the principle of "equal work for equal salary", the Applicant is referring to the same work as was done for the Commonwealth. Now, the Court recalls the content of its interim Ruling No.1 of 14 March, 2007, where it ruled as follows: "... the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to deliberate on the merits of the case without the joinder of the Commonwealth Secretariat, because the latter is not a necessary party to be summoned by the Applicant". 29. Consequently, the Court having already ruled that the Commonwealth is not a party directly involved in the litigation, it cannot apply the conditions of remuneration, by comparing them with those offered in the latter case in point, more so when the beneficiaries in the two situations are the same Defendants. The Court also recalls the principle derived from the law on obligations according to which "obligations are binding only on those who freely contracted them", and states thereby that in the case in point, there has not been subrogation of the Commonwealth by the Defendants, and it shall not be binding on the latter to act as the Commonwealth did. 30. Indeed, the principle of equality of salary, which implies the elimination of salary discrimination based on whatever criteria that may relate to the person of the salaried worker, does not apply to the diversity of the sources of remuneration. Here, the salaries proposed by the Defendants are to be paid, not from the funds of the Commonwealth, but from the budget of the Defendants themselves. This was what was established as a principle, by Court of Justice of the European Union, in the 17th September 2002 Judgment on Lawrence and Regent Office Care Ltd. & Others (Report 1-07325-C.C.E.E.) when it stated that "the principle of equal work, equal salary, does not apply when the observed disparities in remuneration cannot be attributed to a single source". 31. As it were, the Court emphasises the risk of possible discrimination between the Applicant and his other Lecturer colleagues in the same university, if he should be paid based on a different salary scale, for, the principle of "equal work, equal salary" also signifies that the employer is bound to offer the same remuneration "to the salaried workers placed under the same conditions". This is the principle upheld in Judgment No. 5274 of 15 December 1998 delivered by the Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation of Paris in Case Concerning S. A. Aubin v. Chatel, where it is stated that "this obligation is binding on the employer even in cases where the salaried workers are of different nationalities." The issue is rather, that of finding out whether in the instant Applicant was a victim of under-payment vis-a-vis the other Lectures of the same university, and whether such treatment could be described in terms of a violation of the principle of equal work for equal salary. But, as things are, the action of the Applicant does not target a comparison with his other colleague Lecturers, but with the salary system obtaining in the Commonwealth Secretariat. And so, on this point, the Court finds that the principle of equal work for equal salary does not apply, on the grounds that the sources of remuneration are not the same. Consequently, the Court decides that there was no violation that principle. Issue 3: Are the rights being claimed by the Applicant positively established by contract or statute? 32. The Defendants submitted that the Application was based on the renewal of a contract of employment, and on offers and counter-offers, and on the grounds that the Application is based on"quantum meruit". The Defendants further argued that the before the Court deals with relations between an employer and an employee, and that the employee having accepted one part salaries (i.e. Six Thousand US Dollars = US$ 6,000) and rejected the other part, the question now boils down to finding out whether the Applicant's claim to the remaining amount of money to be paid him should be granted upon the salary scale of the Commonwealth or that of the Defendants. And as far as the Defendants are concerned, their refusal to pay the Applicant based on the Commonwealth scale does not constitute a violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights. The Court finds, indeed, by the letter dated 16th April representing Exhibit No. A2 deposited in the Case-File, and letter dated 24th August, 2004 representing Exhibit No. A3 deposited in the Case-File, that in matters of commitment offer of service, the situation was no more than that of relations of fact having generated rights. The problem posed is how to put these rights into effect. The Court examined the nature 6