6 OTEGI MONDRAGON v. SPAIN JUDGMENT of several individuals who had stated before the courts and the Basque Parliament that they had been tortured. 20. In a decision (auto) of 3 July 2006, served on 11 July 2006, the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s amparo appeal inadmissible as manifestly devoid of constitutional content. The Constitutional Court noted at the outset that the right to freedom of expression did not encompass a right to proffer insults. It pointed out in that connection that the Constitution did not prohibit the use of hurtful expressions in all circumstances. However, freedom of expression did not protect vexatious expressions which, regardless of their veracity, were offensive and ignominious and were not pertinent for the purpose of conveying the opinions or information in question. 21. The Constitutional Court considered that the weighing of the competing rights at stake had been carried out in an appropriate manner by the Supreme Court, as the latter had concluded that the impugned remarks had been disproportionate, while taking into account the context in which they had been made, the public nature of the act, the public interest in the subject in question (the use of torture) and the fact that the persons targeted (a politician and the King) were public figures. In the Constitutional Court’s view, there was no denying the ignominious, vexatious and derogatory nature of the impugned remarks, even when directed against a public figure. That finding was all the more valid with regard to the King, who, by virtue of Article 56 § 3 of the Constitution, was “not liable” and was a “symbol of the unity and permanence of the State”. Regard being had to his role as “arbitrator and moderator of the lawful functioning of institutions”, the King occupied a neutral position in political debate. This implied that he was owed institutional respect of a kind that was “substantively” different from that due to other State institutions. The Constitutional Court stated as follows: “... [I]n a democratic system which recognises freedom of ideas and freedom of expression, the fact that [the figure of the King] is characterised in this way does not shield him from all criticism ‘in the exercise of his duties or on account of or in connection with them’ ...; however, such criticism may not extend to attributing acts of public authority to the King – which, as indicated above, is prohibited by the Constitution – as a pretext for gratuitous attacks on his dignity or public esteem.” 22. Lastly, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant’s remarks, on account of their obviously derogatory nature, had clearly gone beyond what could be considered legitimate. It agreed with the Supreme Court that the remarks had expressed open contempt for the King and the institution he embodied, affecting the essential core of his dignity. Hence, such statements could manifestly not fall within the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.