16 OTEGI MONDRAGON v. SPAIN JUDGMENT on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” and whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, among many other authorities, Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, § 19, ECHR 2006-XIII, and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July, cited above, § 45). 50. There is little scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on freedom of expression in the area of political speech or debate – where freedom of expression is of the utmost importance – or in matters of public interest. While freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests. Accordingly, interference with the freedom of expression of a member of parliament calls for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court (see Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, § 42, Series A no. 236). Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance (see Lingens, cited above, § 42; Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia, no. 57829/00, § 40, 27 May 2004; and Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, no. 37698/97, § 30, ECHR 2000-X). He is certainly entitled to have his reputation protected, even when he is not acting in his private capacity, but the requirements of that protection have to be weighed against the interests of open discussion of political issues, since exceptions to freedom of expression must be interpreted narrowly (see, among other authorities, Pakdemirli, cited above, § 45, and Artun and Güvener v. Turkey, no. 75510/01, § 26, 26 June 2007). The Court has also acknowledged that public officials are subject to wider limits of criticism than private individuals, although the criteria applied to them cannot be the same as for politicians (see Janowski v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, § 33, ECHR 1999-I).