OTEGI MONDRAGON v. SPAIN JUDGMENT 15 (a) “Prescribed by law” 45. The Court notes that the statutory basis for the applicant’s conviction was Article 490 § 3 of the Criminal Code, which makes it a punishable offence to insult the King. As to whether that provision was applied by the courts examining the case on the merits with the aim of defending the monarchy, as suggested by the applicant, to the point of making the legal rule in question less foreseeable, this question is actually linked to the relevance and sufficiency of the reasons given by the domestic courts to justify the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. The Court will therefore examine this issue in the context of the “necessity” of the interference. 46. The Court concludes that the interference at issue was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. (b) Legitimate aim 47. In the Court’s view, the interference pursued one of the aims enumerated in Article 10 § 2, namely the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”, in this case the reputation of the King of Spain. (c) “Necessary in a democratic society” (i) General principles 48. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society” (see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49, Series A no. 24; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 45, ECHR 2007-IV; and Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, § 96, ECHR 2009). As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly. 49. The adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling

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