detained and the fact that in spite of an order of the High Court, the Victim was detained beyond the stipulated 48 hours. The Complainant does not provide any evidence of the order of the High Court. 169. The Respondent State denies the allegation. Defining the meaning of 'arbitrary' (from the Oxford English Dictionary) to mean: "To be decided by one's liking; dependent upon will or pleasure; at this discretion or option of any one; derive from mere opinion or preference; not based on the nature of things; hence capricious, uncertain, varying," it argues that the Victim was arrested on 14 January 2003 and brought to court on 16 January 2003 for contravening section 5(2) (a) (1) of the Public Order Security Act (Chapter 11:17). It states that on his first day in court, he was legally represented and the charges were read in open court and no challenge was made as to the appropriateness of the charges. The Respondent State further argues that Zimbabwe's Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (Chapter 9:07) allows a police officer to arrest: "any person whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of having committed any of the offences mentioned in the first schedule." The African Commission notes that the Complainant has not challenged that statement. 170. The Respondent State argues that it is up to the court to make a finding as to whether the arrest by the police officer was reasonable in the circumstances. It goes on to say that in fact when the court placed the Victim on remand and advised him to apply for bail in the High Court, it was confirming that there existed reasonable grounds for Victim's arrest. The Complainant in his rejoinder did not address this statement of the Respondent State. The Respondent State avers that the arrest, therefore, cannot be described as arbitrary in the circumstances. It also argues that the reckoning of time by the Victim is flawed. It states that Section 33(2) of the Interpretation Act, (Chapter 1:01) provides: "Where in an enactment a period of time is expressed to begin on or to be reckoned from a particular day, that day shall not be included in the period." The Complainant has not addressed this argument of the Respondent in his rejoinder. The Respondent State inform the African Commission that the Victim was arrested on 14 January 2003 and brought to court on 16 January 2003 and therefore the statutory limit of forty-eight (48) hours had not elapsed. The Complainant did not also address this argument in his rejoinder. 171. It is instructive to note that in the Jawara case, the African Commission cited its decision on Communication 101/93; Civil Liberties Organization (in respect of Nigeria Bar Association) v Nigeria wherein it had laid down a general principle with respect to freedom of association that "competent authorities should not enact provisions which limit the exercise of this freedom. The competent authorities should not override constitutional provisions or undermine fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution or international human rights standards." This principle, therefore, applies not only to freedom of association but also to all other rights and freedoms. For a State to avail itself of this plea, it must show that such a law is consistent with its obligations under the African Charter. In the instant matter, the African Commission notes that the Victim was in custody for only two days and appeared in court on the second day of his arrest. 172. The African Commission has also stated that simply because an arrest is carried out does not necessarily amount to a violation of Article 6. In Communication 48/90-50/91-52/91-89/93: Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan,32 the African Commission stated that this article must be interpreted in such a way as to permit arrests only in the exercise of powers normally granted to the security forces in a democratic society. In the instant matter, the African Commission is of the view that following the arrest of the Victim, he was charged with a recognizable offence, allowed to contact a lawyer of his choice and granted bail after two days in custody. That cannot amount to a violation of Article 6. However, the Complainant had the opportunity to deny the statement and detailed response of the Respondent State, as far as the violation of this article is concerned it chose not to do. As the Commission said supra, where an allegation goes on unchallenged the African Commission will infer that allegation is indeed true. In its Resolution on the Right to Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial, the African Commission had, in expounding on the guarantees of the right to fair trial under the African Charter observed thus: "... the right to fair trial includes, among other things, the following: (b) Persons who are arrested shall be informed at the time of arrest, in a language which they understand of the reason for their arrest and shall be informed promptly of any charges against them. 173. According to the African Commission's settled case-law, the presumption under Article 6 is in favour of release.33 As established in the Jawara case the second limb of Article 6 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional 22