5 This expression stresses the “sham” that is rooted in some judgments, as a result of the machinations —whether their outcome be an acquittal or a conviction— of the authorities who investigate the facts, bring charges, and render judgment. The process has been “like” a process, and the judgment serves a specific design rather than the interests of justice. 18. However, such expression is not necessarily applicable to all cases to be encompassed, which evidence a manifold reality. Yet, it reflects a highly relevant issue: the subsistence or the decadence of double jeopardy –which used to be referred to as the “sanctity” of double jeopardy— which, in turn, renders operative the ne bis in idem principle, widely adopted in domestic and international systems. Therefore, what seemed to be unquestionable not so long ago is now being questioned: the validity of the judgment which acquires the authority of a final pronouncement, the review of which is barred by double jeopardy (in its double formal and material projection) and which, therefore, cannot be challenged by any legal means, regardless of the liability of a different nature of those who unduly or illegitimately rendered it. 19. The decadence of the absolute authority of the double jeopardy principle inherent to a final and unappealable judgment, understood in the traditional sense of the expression, is evident. International jurisdiction on human rights and international criminal jurisdiction could hardly be effective, and might not even exist, if the final decisions of domestic jurisdictional bodies were deemed to be incontestable in all cases. The incorrectness or the irrelevancy of a domestic judicial decision which puts an end to a dispute may be inferred from a variety of circumstances: an error made by the authority who issued such decision, even if there be no other source of injustice; or the illegality or illegitimacy with which the judge acts, whether in the proceedings (due process breaches) or by misrepresenting the facts leading to judgment. In both cases a judgment will be rendered which does not further justice and which apparently —formally— serves legal certainty. 20. Reflections on this issue are increasingly numerous in domestic precedents — particularly in the precedents of constitutionality courts— as they have been in international precedents before. All things considered, it is evident that the authority of the double jeopardy principle is only justified by the authority which it derives from a regular procedure and from the legitimacy of the acts performed by the judge. It is true that the solution of adjudicatory cases and the conclusion of conflicts is in the interest of society and of the State, but it is also true that such worthy aim —which “sanctifies” the double jeopardy principle— should not be sought and achieved at any cost, including the abuse of the means which make jurisdictional action by the State legitimate, an action to which the custody of both legal interests and ethical values is entrusted. In other words, the end does not justify the means; these, instead, contribute to the justification of the aim sought after. This inversion of the old pragmatic maxim is especially relevant as to procedural matters, such as the admission and validity of evidence. 21. Moreover, this has been acknowledged in the precedents of the Inter-American Court, which in several cases has found against the validity (due to their incompatibility with the American Convention) of criminal proceedings when serious procedural breaches have been committed, whereby it becomes necessary to institute new proceedings or reopen previous ones at the point at which the breach was committed. The outcome, in any case, will be the rendering of a new judgment. To put it in different terms, what prevails is the notion that flawed proceedings are not an actual proceedings and that the (apparent) judgment rendered therein is not a genuine judgment. Should this be accepted, the