4 victims, their next of kin or representatives, the Court, after hearing the opinions of the other parties to the case, shall decide whether such acquiescence and its juridical effects are acceptable (...).” 13. As it can be noted, the admission referred to in the foregoing provisions includes: a) the facts alleged in the application submitted by the Commission, which often are quite numerous and complex and which, therefore, require specific identification by the party acknowledging them so as to avoid doubt or confusion; and b) the claims for declaratory and condemnatory judgment —related to the assessment of the facts in the light of the rules in the Convention and the pertinent reparations thereof— filed by the applicant Commission itself and by the alleged victims, who in this regard —although not as far as regards the report on the facts of the case in point— may make their petitions independently of the Inter-American Commission, as provided for by the rules and regulations and as reaffirmed by the precedents of the Court. 14. Insufficient acquiescence, acknowledgment of liability or admission of facts (technically, each of these concepts has its own scope) may give rise to opposing opinions on the nature and effects of the act, which will finally be resolved by the Court, always expected to decide on the admissibility of acquiescence and, eventually, on the scope thereof as well. It is desirable that the State should clearly establish the nature and effects it attaches to the procedural act it performs, for, otherwise, the Court would be forced to “construe” the will of the State and ascribe to it the characteristics which, in its own opinion, it has. D) ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS 15. Opinions differ as to the presentation of the facts, both at the hearing and in the text of the judgment, in cases where there has been acquiescence. On the one hand, it is argued that the dispute regarding the facts has ceased, and that, therefore, it is not meet that the parties or the Court refer to them thereafter. On the other hand, it is considered that the facts are essential data in the dispute, analyzed as a whole, and must be known and assessed in order to establish the terms of judgment, in addition to the fact that the statement of what has occurred —already acknowledged by the State— is an input for the “teaching effectiveness” of the proceedings and contributes to prevent repetition of similar events. 16. In this regard, it is relevant to bear in mind that the acknowledgment of facts is not binding for the Court, which may require clarifications and even decide that the proceedings should continue despite such acknowledgment, and that, in any case, acknowledgement does not in itself amount to a legal assessment of such acts, something which the Court is the only one entitled to do. It has already been said that the truth of the facts upon which the case is based does not derive from the admission of such facts by the parties —the formal or conventional truth— but from sufficient and conclusive evidence —the material or historical truth— which is what is sought in international proceedings on human rights. Judgment is and contains, in substance, a reflection of the Court on wrongful acts and the legal consequences thereof, and an assessment made by the same body in order to pronounce the pertinent decision. It is not reasonable to exclude the acts committed in violation of human rights from such reflection and such assessment, from which it is necessary to derive certain consequences. E) DOUBLE JEOPARDY 17. In the Judgment to which I attach this Opinion, the Court has used the expression “sham double jeopardy” (para. 98), which has already been used before (Case of Carpio Nicolle et al., November 22, 2004 Judgment, paras. 131 and 132).