individual”. Article 18 serves as a break by referring to the family. Articles 19-24 make specific reference to “all peoples.” 175. It continues: “Given such specificity, it is surprising that the African Charter fails to define “peoples” unless it was trusted that its meaning could be discerned from the prevailing international instruments and norms. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. One, that the African Charter seeks to make provision for group or collective rights, that is, that set of rights that can conceivably be enjoyed only in a collective 24 manner like the right to self determination or independence or sovereignty…”. 176. The Commission deduces from the foregoing discourse that peoples’ rights are equally important as are individual rights. They deserve, and must be given protection. The minimum that can be said of peoples’ rights is that, each member of the group carries with him/her the individual rights into the group, on top of what the group enjoys in its collectivity, i.e. common rights which benefit the community such as the right to development, peace, security, a healthy environment, selfdetermination and the right to equitable share of their resources. 177. It is in the light of the above that the Commission shall examine the allegations against the Respondent State, concerning the violations of the collective rights cited hereinabove. 178. The Commission states that after thorough analysis of the arguments and literature, it finds that the people of Southern Cameroon can legitimately claim to be a “people”. Besides the individual rights due to Southern Cameroon[ians], they have a distinct identity which attracts certain collective rights. The UNESCO Group of Experts report referred to hereinabove, states that for a collective of individuals to constitute a “people” they need to manifest some, or all the identified attributes. The Commission agrees with the Respondent State that a “people” may manifest ethno-anthropological attributes. Ethno- anthropological attributes may be added to the characteristics of a “people”. Such attributes are necessary only when determining indigenology of a “people”[quote], but cannot be used as the only determinant factor to accord or deny the enjoyment or protection of peoples’ rights. Was [sic] it the intention of the State Parties to rely on ethno-anthropological roots only to determine [quote]“peoples’ rights,” they would have said so in the African Charter? As it is, the African Charter guarantees equal protection to people on the continent, including other racial groups whose ethnoanthropological roots are not African. 179. Based on that reasoning, the Commission finds that “the people of Southern Cameroon” qualify to be referred to as a“people” because they manifest numerous characteristics and affinities, which include a common history, linguistic tradition, territorial connection and political outlook. More importantly they identify themselves as a people with a separate and distinct identity. Identity is an innate characteristic within a people. It is up to other external people to recognise such existence, but not to deny it. 180. The Respondent State might not recognise such innate characteristics. That shall not resolve the question of self-identification of Southern Cameroonians. It might actually postpone the solution to the problems in Southern Cameroon, including those already highlighted hereinabove. The Respondent State acknowledges that there have been problems created regularly by the secessionist SCNC and SCAPO, in that part of its territory, which calls itself the “Southern Cameroon”. 181. The Commission is aware that post-colonial Africa has witnessed numerous cases of domination of one group of people over others, either on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity, without such domination constituting colonialism in the classical sense. Civil wars and internal conflicts on the continent are testimony to that fact. It is incumbent on State Parties, therefore, whenever faced with allegations of the nature contained in the present communication, to address them rather than ignore them under the guise of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Mechanisms such as the African Commission were established to resolve disputes in an amicable and peaceful manner. If such mechanisms are utilised in good faith, they can spare the continent valuable human and material resources, otherwise lost due to conflicts fighting against ethnic, religious domination or economic marginalisation. 182. The Commission shall address the question, whether the people of Southern Cameroon are entitled to the right to self-determination. In so doing it shall contextualise the question by dealing, not with the 1961 UN Plebsicite, or the 1972 Unification, but rather the events of 1993 and 1994 on the