of the East African Community under Article 3 clause 3 (b) of the Treaty. Counsel distinguished the authority cited by the Respondent’s Counsel from the present Reference and submitted that whereas the issues before Uganda’s Constitutional Court in that Petition were about provision of sufficient maternal health services in the country, and that that is why the Court held that it was a matter of resource allocation which should be determined by the Executive and other political organs of the State, the issues in the present case are about crystallised provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty which are foundational and core to the continued existence of the Treaty. We have considered the rival positions of the parties in support of their respective positions on this matter and we opine as here under: 26. It is common ground that under Article 27 (1) of the Treaty, this Court has jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the Treaty, where such jurisdiction is not conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner States. We think this is plain enough. This Court does have jurisdiction to interpret and apply any and all provisions of the Treaty save those excepted by the proviso to Article 27. While we agree, with the Respondent that the Court’s jurisdiction will be extended via a Protocol as envisaged by Article 27 (2), we do not consider that the envisaged extension, in any way, acts to prohibit the Court from interpreting and applying any provision of the Treaty. In particular, this Court has consistently held, and the Appellate Division has consistently upheld, that mere inclusion of allegations of human rights violations in a Reference will not deter the Court from exercising its interpretation jurisdiction under Article 27(1) of the Treaty- (see especially the Katabazi case, Attorney General of the Republic of Rwanda v. Plaxeda Rugumba, Appeal No. 1 of 2012 and Attorney General of Uganda v Omar Awadh and 6 Others, Appeal No 2 of 2012.) REFERENCE NO.5 OF 2011      Page 12