94 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session onus on the responsible State to show what proportion of the damage was not attributable to its conduct. It said: We think it clear that not all of the damage was done by the Chinese crew of the Zafiro. The evidence indicates that an unascertainable part was done by Filipino insurgents, and makes it likely that some part was done by the Chinese employees of the company. But we do not consider that the burden is on Great Britain to prove exactly what items of damage are chargeable to the Zafiro. As the Chinese crew of the Zafiro are shown to have participated to a substantial extent and the part chargeable to unknown wrongdoers can not be identified, we are constrained to hold the United States liable for the whole. In view, however, of our finding that a considerable, though unascertainable, part of the damage is not chargeable to the Chinese crew of the Zafiro, we hold that interest on the claims should not be allowed.475 (14) Concerns are sometimes expressed that a general principle of reparation of all loss flowing from a breach might lead to reparation which is out of all proportion to the gravity of the breach. However, the notion of “proportionality” applies differently to the different forms of reparation.476 It is addressed, as appropriate, in the individual articles in chapter II dealing with the forms of reparation. Article 32. Irrelevance of internal law The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this Part. Commentary (1) Article 3 concerns the role of internal law in the characterization of an act as wrongful. Article 32 makes clear the irrelevance of a State’s internal law to compliance with the obligations of cessation and reparation. It provides that a State which has committed an internationally wrongful act may not invoke its internal law as a justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this part. Between them, articles 3 and 32 give effect for the purposes of State responsibility to the general principle that a State may not rely on its internal law as a justification for its failure to comply with its international obligations.477Although practical difficulties may arise for a State organ confronted with an obstacle to compliance posed by the rules of the internal legal system under which it is bound to operate, the State is not entitled to oppose its internal law or practice as a legal barrier to the fulfilment of an international obligation arising under Part Two. (2) Article 32 is modelled on article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This general principle is equally applicable to the international obligations deriving from the rules of State responsibility set out in Part Two. The principle may be qualified by the relevant primary rule, or by a lex specialis, such as article 50 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides for just satisfaction in lieu of full reparation “if the inter475 The Zafiro case (see footnote 154 above), pp. 164–165. See articles 35 (b), 37, paragraph 3, and 39 and commentaries. 477 See paragraphs (2) to (4) of the commentary to article 3. 476 nal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made”.478 (3) The principle that a responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations arising out of the commission of an internationally wrongful act is supported both by State practice and international decisions. For example, the dispute between Japan and the United States in 1906 over California’s discriminatory education policies was resolved by the revision of the Californian legislation.479 In the incident concerning article 61, paragraph 2, of the Weimar Constitution (Constitution of the Reich of 11 August 1919), a constitutional amendment was provided for in order to ensure the discharge of the obligation deriving from article 80 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles).480 In the Peter Pázmány University case, PCIJ specified that the property to be returned should be “freed from any measure of transfer, compulsory administration, or sequestration”.481 In short, international law does not recognize that the obligations of a responsible State under Part Two are subject to the State’s internal legal system nor does it allow internal law to count as an excuse for non-performance of the obligations of cessation and reparation. Article 33. Scope of international obligations set out in this Part 1. The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. 2. This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State. Commentary (1) Article 33 concludes the provisions of chapter I of Part Two by clarifying the scope and effect of the international obligations covered by the Part. In particular, paragraph 1 makes it clear that identifying the State or States towards which the responsible State’s obligations in Part Two exist depends both on the primary rule establishing 478 Article 41 of the Convention, as amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby. Other examples include article 32 of the Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and article 30 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. 479 See R. L. Buell, “The development of the anti-Japanese agitation in the United States”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 37 (1922), pp. 620 et seq. 480 See British and Foreign State Papers, 1919 (London, HM Stationery Office, 1922), vol. 112, p. 1094. 481 Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro/Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Peter Pázmány University), Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 61, p. 208, at p. 249.