61. In this case, on the issue of the procedure being prolonged, the Commission notes that the Complainant’s petition for the annulment of the first separation order elicited no response until seven (7) months later when it was dismissed. Similarly, the petition for annulment of the second separation order produced no outcome after one year of waiting. In a case involving the deprivation of liberty, the time taken to respond to a simple petition for annulment, filed before the same judicial authority that issued the order being challenged, is obviously long. 62. Cameroon’s criminal law confirms this position given that under Section 275(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, for example, it is provided that “the Inquiry Control Chamber shall hear and determine the appeal within thirty (30) days after receiving the application.” Better still, Section 275(2) provides that in case of remand in custody - as is the case here – “it shall be bound to deliver its ruling within ten (10) days after receiving the application.” Even though Cameroon’s Criminal Procedure Code is silent on the timeframe within which the examining magistrate is required to respond to petitions for annulment of orders issued by him, the Commission is of the view that such a timeframe cannot be significantly longer than the prescribed timeframe for appeals brought before the Inquiry Control Chamber. 63. In any event, in view of the abovementioned provisions, the Commission finds that the periods of seven (7) months and one year taken by the magistrate to respond to petitions for annulment of the separation orders are well beyond the statutory timeframes. In light of the foregoing and given that the timeframes prescribed by the law are in compliance with obligations under the African Charter, the Commission concludes that the remedies concerned have been unduly prolonged. 16