42. In a similar case, the Appellate Division of this Court has rejected the concept of legal continuing violations and opted instead for a strict interpretation of Article 30(2) of the Treaty in order to protect the principle of legal certainty. It has so decided that: “The principle of legal certainty requires strict application of the time-limit in Article 30(2) of the Treaty. Furthermore, nowhere does the Treaty provide any power to the Court to extend, to condone, to waive, or to modify the prescribed time limit for any reason (including for ‘continuing violations)”. [See Omar Owadh’s case (supra), p. 21]. 43. In view of all the foregoing, we conclude that the Applicant filed his Reference out of the prescribed time, and that, consequently, the Reference is time-barred for not complying with the provisions of Article 30(2) of the Treaty. We answer this issue in the affirmative. 44. Since the issue is answered in the affirmative, accordingly, we refrain from entertaining the remaining issues for the simple reason that the Reference is no longer alive. 45. Consequently, the Reference is dismissed. 46. As for costs, given the peculiar circumstances of this Reference, it would not serve the ends of justice to condemn the Applicant in costs. We accordingly deem it just that each party shall bear its/his own costs. REFERENCE NO.3 OF 2012 Page 16

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