- The United Nations Human Rights Committee, while examining the meaning and scope of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, was of the view that the right to choose one’s counsel: “… apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialised, civilian or military.” (General Comment No. 32, Right to equality before the courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 90th Session (2007) of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Part III, paragraph 22). This last point, at any rate, urges the Court to consider another aspect of the argument put forth by Burkina Faso, equally canvassed in the course of the hearing of 7 June 2016. That argument consists of particular emphasis being placed on the peculiar nature of the procedure in question – as having been initiated on the basis of the Martial Code of Justice, as applied to a military person and for offences relating to “State security” – so as to advance the claim that normal procedural rules may not apply in the case at hand; simply put, that the ‘military’ and ‘political’ nature of the case precludes the application of the ordinary criminal procedure, and does justify restrictions placed on the rights of a defence. It was by virtue of that narrowly-defined standpoint, founded upon the exceptional nature of the context within which the events unfolded, that Burkina Faso, the Defendant State, was thus able to affirm that certain instruments invoked by the Applicant “… did not contain provisions relating to martial courts”. The Court holds that such argument can be refuted, even by virtue of the letter of the texts. Indeed, the texts clearly provide that the right to choose one’s counsel shall be upheld before “… all the courts …” (cf. above-cited Article 34 of the 24 April 1961 Convention on Judicial Co-operation signed between France and Upper Volta), or before “… all courts and tribunals…” (cf. above-cited General Comment No. 32, Right to equality before the courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 90th Session (2007) of the United Nations Human Rights Committee). The above-cited provisions equally enable one to object to the thesis which claims that military courts did not exist in France and so the reciprocal nature of the agreement was lacking. The texts indeed do talk of “all courts …” and “… all the courts and tribunals …”. On the other hand, the case law of the ECOWAS Court of Justice itself has always held that the peculiar nature of a procedure, notably in regard to political 11