26. The Court considers that for it to assume material jurisdiction, it is sufficient that the rights of which a violation is alleged are protected by the Charter or by any other human rights instrument ratified by the State concerned,7 which is the case here since the Applicant alleges violation of rights protected by Articles 1, 4, 5 and 7 of the Charter. 27. The Court would, therefore, not be sitting as an appellate court if it were to consider the Applicant’s allegations. ii. Objection based on the Court not being empowered to repeal a law 28. The Court recalls its jurisprudence that ordering the repeal of a law is a form of redress for human rights violations.8 Notably, Article 27(1) of the Protocol provides that “if the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation”. 29. The Court considers that, under this provision, it is empowered to order reparation measures only if a violation of human or people’s rights has been found and if such measures are appropriate. It may, therefore, order the repeal of a law if it deems such a measure appropriate to remedy an established violation. 30. Consequently, the Court considers that it is acting within the remit of its jurisdiction. It, therefore, dismisses the Respondent State’s objection and holds that it has material jurisdiction to hear the present Application. 7 Mussa and Mangaya v. Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (28 November 2019) 3 AfCLR 629, §18; Franck David Omary and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania (admissibility) (28 March 2014) 1 AfCLR 358, § 74; Peter Chacha v. United Republic of Tanzania (admissibility) (28 March 2014) 1 AfCLR 413, § 118. 8 XYZ v. Republic of Benin (merits and reparation) (Judgement of 27 September 2020) 4 AfCLR 49, §28. 9