Applicant genuinely suffered from pains necessitating treatment, he would have communicated this to a medical professional to seek necessary assistance. 178. As the Court has previously acknowledged domestic courts are better positioned to evaluate the factual intricacies surrounding a case. In the absence of any glaring errors or miscarriage of justice, the Court does not deem it imperative to supplant its own assessment and arrive at a different factual determination. Moreover, there is no indication on record to suggest that the Applicant was denied medical aid after having requested it. In fact, in his affidavits, the Applicant concedes that a few days later after he arrived at the prison, he “was taken back” to the hospital to repair the catheter for his wounds.54 In any event, the said denial of the medical treatment for the Applicant’s injury is not of such level of severity to constitute a cruel and inhumane treatment as alleged by the Applicant.55 In view of this, the Court dismisses this aspect of the Applicant’s allegation. 179. In light of the preceding assessment, the Court finds that the Respondent State violated the Applicant’s right to dignity, as safeguarded under Article 5 of the Charter, by the Applicant’s lengthy placement on death row. VIII. REPARATIONS 180. The Court notes that Article 27(1) of the Protocol stipulates that “[lf] the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.” 181. The Court consistently held that, for reparations to be granted, the Respondent State should first be internationally responsible for the wrongful 54 Exhibit A, Affidavit from Makungu Misalaba, signed on 25 October 2019, para. 29 See for e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978), ECHR, § 162; Öcalan v. Turkey (2005), ECHR, §§. 180-181. 55 46