of every individual to have their life and personal integrity respected. Additionally, he argues that these provisions strictly prohibit any arbitrary deprivation of this fundamental right. 141. The Applicant asserts that the Respondent State’s mandatory death penalty violates Article 6 of the ICCPR and Article 4 of the Charter as well as the UDHR. He contends that the mandatory death penalty erases the presumption in favour of life, erases the distinction between the categories of murder and violates the right to an individualised sentencing process. He further submits that had there not been the mandatory death sentence, the High Court would have taken into consideration mitigating circumstances in sentencing him. 142. In this regard, the Applicant refers to the Court’s decision in Ally Rajabu and Others v. Tanzania, which established that the mandatory death penalty is a violation of Articles 4 and 7 of the Charter. It is his contention that the High Court, like in Rajabu, was unable to consider significant mitigating evidence that would have kept their human dignity and proved their rehabilitation potential. 143. In this vein, the Applicant contends that the national courts could have considered his law-abiding nature, youth and good character, his deeplyheld belief in witchcraft, his remorse, and good behaviour in prison. He asserts that this would have provided crucial context on his state of mind when he committed the killings and attempted to commit suicide. He is of the view that had the High Court taken his mitigating circumstances into consideration he would not have received the death sentence. * 144. On its part, the Respondent State disputes the Applicant’s submission that the death penalty violates the Constitution and the right to life enshrined in the UDHR and the ICCPR. It asserts that the death penalty is compatible with its Constitution, the UDHR and the ICCPR. It is the Respondent State’s 36