54 GUZZARDI v. ITALY JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BINDSCHEDLER-ROBERT (art. 5-1-c) probably denotes that this problem was not fully thought through; it does not, however, prevent a democratic State from taking the requisite protective measures when organised crime threatens to destroy its legal institutions. The very terminology employed in the sub-paragraph (art. 5-1-c), which clearly refers to activities that are manifestly criminal and not to activities covered by the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, renders groundless the fear that a less restrictive interpretation would favour the institution of a police state. The judgment also throws doubt on the lawfulness under sub-paragraph (c) (art. 5-1-c) of the measure in question, on the ground that, leaving aside the manner of its implementation, an order for compulsory residence as such does not constitute deprivation of liberty. As a general statement, this last observation is certainly correct. However, it must not be forgotten that Italian case-law has recognised that an order for compulsory residence in part of a district, such as Asinara, was in conformity with the law. That the Court should now classify the measure as "deprivation of liberty" in no way alters its "lawfulness" under Italian law. Finally, the requirements of Article 5 § 3 (art. 5-3) were satisfied in the present case. In fact, as soon as he had been released from detention on remand, Mr. Guzzardi was brought, under arrest, before a court and that court issued the compulsory residence order; there was thus no reason for requiring that he be brought before a court another time. What Mr. Guzzardi might have claimed - always on the assumption that he had been deprived of his liberty - was compliance with Article 5 § 4 (art. 5-4), a provision which anyway was not alleged to have been violated. I therefore conclude from the above that in any event Italy has not violated Article 5 (art. 5), but that the Court should have refrained from ruling on the merits of the case.