M.S.S. v. BELGIUM AND GREECE JUDGMENT 51 2. Merits 249. The Court has already reiterated the general principles found in the case-law on Article 3 of the Convention and applicable in the instant case (see paragraphs 216-22 above). It also considers it necessary to point out that Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home (see Chapman, cited above, § 99). Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living (see Müslim v. Turkey, no. 53566/99, § 85, 26 April 2005). 250. The Court is of the opinion, however, that what is at issue in the instant case cannot be considered in those terms. Unlike in the above-cited Müslim case (§§ 83 and 84), the obligation to provide accommodation and decent material conditions to impoverished asylum-seekers has now entered into positive law and the Greek authorities are bound to comply with their own legislation, which transposes Community law, namely Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers in the member States (“the Reception Directive”; see paragraph 84 above). What the applicant holds against the Greek authorities in this case is that, because of their deliberate actions or omissions, it has been impossible in practice for him to avail himself of these rights and provide for his essential needs. 251. The Court attaches considerable importance to the applicant’s status as an asylum-seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see, mutatis mutandis, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], no. 15766/03, § 147, ECHR 2010). It notes the existence of a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR and the standards set out in the Reception Directive. 252. That said, the Court must determine whether a situation of extreme material poverty can raise an issue under Article 3. 253. The Court reiterates that it has not excluded the possibility “that State responsibility [under Article 3] could arise for ‘treatment’ where an applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity” (see Budina v. Russia (dec.), no. 45603/05, 18 June 2009). 254. It observes that the situation in which the applicant has found himself is particularly serious. He allegedly spent months living in a state of the most extreme poverty, unable to cater for his most basic needs: food, hygiene and a place to live. Added to that was the ever-present fear of being attacked and robbed and the total lack of any likelihood of his situation