various forms and assessment must always depend on the circumstances of each case. 141. In the present Application, the Court recalls that the District Court imposed a sentence of thirty (30) years in prison and twelve (12) strokes of the cane. It is also notable that when the Applicant further appealed to the High Court and to the Court of Appeal, the findings of the District Court were upheld in their entirety. The Court also notes, however, that although the Applicant was sentenced to be caned twelve (12) times, the record does not indicate if the sentence was actually carried out. 142. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Respondent State’s Constitution in Article 13(6)(e) proscribes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This notwithstanding, the Court also, without being exhaustive, notes the following provisions in the Respondent State’s laws: the Corporal Punishment Act, which is an Act meant to “regulate the infliction of corporal punishment”; sections 25 and 28 of the Penal Code which, generally, recognises corporal punishment as a legitimate form of punishment in sections 131 and 131A of the Penal Code which recognise corporal punishment as a lawful form of sentence for the offence of rape; and sections 167 and 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which also include corporal punishment among the permissible punishments that a court can mete out. 143. The Court finds that the existence of statutes authorising corporal punishment contravenes the Charter. Specifically in relation to the Applicant, the Court holds that the existence of law authorising corporal punishment creates a likelihood that the punishment could be executed which would operate to enhance his mental anguish and thus further undermine his dignity. In the circumstances, the Court upholds the Applicant’s claim and holds that his sentence to be caned twelve (12) times violated his right to dignity as provided under Article 5 of the Charter. 34