deal with human rights violations within their jurisdictions before an international human rights body is called upon to determine the State’s responsibility for the same.13 50. The Court recalls its position where it held that, in so far as the criminal proceedings against an applicant have been determined by the highest appellate court, the Respondent State will be deemed to have had the opportunity to redress the violations alleged by the Applicant to have arisen from those proceedings.14 51. In the instant case, the Court notes that the Applicant’s appeal before the Court of Appeal, the highest judicial organ of the Respondent State, was determined when that Court rendered its judgment on 19 April 2013. Therefore, the Respondent State had the opportunity to address the violations alleged by the Applicant arising from the Applicant’s trial and appeals.15 52. Regarding the Respondent State’s contention that the Applicant ought to have filed an application for review of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the Court has previously held that such an application for review is an extraordinary remedy which applicants are not required to exhaust.16 The Court, therefore, finds that the Applicant is deemed to have exhausted local remedies since the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, the highest judicial organ in the Respondent State, had upheld his conviction and sentence, following proceedings which allegedly violated his rights. 53. In light of the foregoing, the Court dismisses the Respondent State’s objection based on the non-exhaustion of local remedies. 13 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya (merits) (26 May 2017) 2 AfCLR 9, §§ 93-94. 14 Rajabu Yusuph v. United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 036/2017 Ruling of 24 March 2022 (admissibility), § 51. 15 Ibid, § 52. 16 Abubakari v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 78. 14