said Charter refers to human rights does not make it a human rights instrument within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Protocol. 96. Regarding the Constitutive Act, the Respondent State argues that the assertion that a reference to human rights is sufficient to qualify a treaty as a human rights instrument is unsubstantiated. It submits that the judgments used as basis by the Applicant State on this point should be disregarded. It submits that in Jean Claude Roger Gombert v. Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, the Court held that it could rule on violations of the rights of individuals and groups, and not on those of private or public corporate entities. In the same vein, it adds that in Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of Tanzania, the Court held that an application cannot be declared inadmissible simple because the applicant fails to cite the relevant provision of the Constitutive Act or the Charter. 97. In conclusion, the Respondent State submits that the Court cannot hear cases based solely on the Constitutive Act and Charter of the United Nations. 98. At the hearing, the Respondent State reiterated the content of its submissions. It added that it was important for the Court to decide whether the United Nations Charter, the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Great Lakes Pact and the PSC Framework Agreement were human rights instruments. 99. In this regard, the Respondent State argued that the Court's mandate is to hear allegations of human rights violations and not to deal with questions of peace and security. In its view, the Applicant State seeks to broaden the jurisdiction of the Court by invoking, in support of its allegations, the United Nations Charter, the Constitutive Act and other peace and security instruments. 100. According to the Respondent State, the fact that an application filed with the Court must be compatible with the Constitutive Act does not make the latter a human rights instrument. With regard to the United Nations Charter, the 24