43. It further submits that a combined reading of Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the
Charter supports the view that the existence of a dispute is not a prerequisite
for the exercise of the Court’s material jurisdiction. In its view, the
negotiation between parties as required by these articles is merely an option
and not intended to prove the existence of a dispute.
44. The Applicant State submits that the Court could draw inspiration from the
Commission’s practice in inter-State applications as regards the
requirement of proof of a dispute. It drew the Court’s attention, in this
respect, to three inter-state cases brought before the Commission, namely,
Communication 277/99 - Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) v.
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Communication 422/12 - Sudan v. South
Sudan and Communication 478/14 - Republic of Djibouti v. State of Eritrea,
two of which were declared admissible regardless of the question of the
existence of a dispute.
45. The Applicant State submits further that, in any event, there is no difficulty
in establishing, in the present case, that a dispute exists, a question which
is of substance and not of procedure, as the ICJ held in its judgment on
preliminary objections Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation). It indicates that for this purpose, account should be taken of
any statement or document exchanged between the parties as well as any
exchanges that took place at multilateral forums, as it emerges from the
order for provisional measures issued by the ICJ in the matter of Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel).
46. The Applicant State also argues that it must be shown that the Respondent
State was aware, or could not have been oblivious to the fact that its views
were clearly opposed by the Respondent State. It submits that it is not
necessary for the Respondent State to have expressly opposed the
Applicant State’s claims, since the Respondent State’s silence may, in
certain circumstances, be sufficient. In this respect, it cites the judgments
12