85. The Applicant State further avers that, as regards the compatibility of an application with the Constitutive Act, the Court held in Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of Tanzania, that the Constitutive Act has the status of “any other relevant human rights instrument.” 86. Regarding the Charter of the United Nations, the Applicant State argues that if, in Franck David Omary and others v. United Republic of Tanzania, the Court considered that Article 60 of the Charter authorized it to draw inspiration from the said Charter, it was because the Charter is, in whole or in part, a human rights instrument. On this point, it adds that the Charter of the United Nations is part of “international law on human and peoples’ rights” and contains “express enunciations of human rights for the benefit of individuals”. 87. The Applicant State underscores that this reasoning is applicable to the other instruments whose application the Respondent State is seeking to have set aside in the instant case. 88. Regarding the Respondent State’s argument that “the provisions of the instruments in question to which it is seeking to make reference are those concerning the use of force and the maintenance of international peace and security”, it argues that there is an inseparable link between the said notions and human rights, as the use of force by one State against another has a negative impact on human rights. It argues, moreover, that the right to peace and security is a human right. 89. According to the Applicant State, even if the said instruments are not human rights instruments, the Court still has jurisdiction if the rights alleged to have been violated are protected by the Charter, as it indicated in Bernard Anbataayela Mornah v. Republic of Benin and Others, (Sahrawi Arab Republic and Mauritius, intervening States) and Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of Tanzania. 90. At the hearing, the Applicant State reiterated the content of its submissions. 22