154. The Respondent State rejects the argument that the arrest and detention of the Victim was in violation of Article 6 of the Charter and submits that the Victim was arrested and detained in accordance with the lawsuit No⁰ 502 of 1994 for endangering the security of the state. 155. The Respondent State submits that the Victim was provisionally detained until the completion of the investigations and was later released on 14 November 1996. The Respondent State further submits that the Victim was however arrested on 21 November 1996 in accordance with the Emergency Law, due to his continued security threat. The Respondent adds that the Victim was released and rearrested numerous times until he was definitively released on 17 March 2011. The Respondent State submits that the arrest of the Victim was motivated by legal and judicial precautionary measures and was not arbitrary. The Respondent State submits that there were factual motivations and legal reasons pertaining to the detention of the Victim due to the continuing threat he posed to the security and public order of the State. The Respondent State submits that the Victim was accused of having joined an underground extremist group, which aimed to disrupt the rule of law and overthrow the country’s institutions. 156. The Respondent State avers that as the detention was not related to criminal offences, it did not require the transfer of the case to a criminal court. 157. The Respondent State submits that the arrest was permitted by the Emergency Law, which was in effect at that time. 158. The Respondent State submits that although the African Charter does not provide for a state of emergency, under articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, the Commission may refer and apply the internationally established and acceptable norms and practices provided for in the instruments adopted by the UN. The Respondent State submits that this should apply to state of emergencies. 159. The Respondent State submits that the Emergency Law respects the conditions mentioned under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on state of emergencies and permissible derogations. The Respondent State submits that the Emergency Law does not compromise the right to life, the right to be protected from torture and other ill-treatment, slavery or forced labour and the right to freedom of religion among others. The Respondent State submits that the procedure to declare a state of emergency follows the procedure established by international human rights standards in that respect. 160. The Respondent State avers that the current framework surrounding the state of emergency in Egypt reflects the evolution of the Egyptian vision and is compatible with the developments and regional efforts connected to human rights. The Respondent State submits that the state of emergency is motivated by the nature of the risks faced, which may not be dealt with through measures and actions taken by the State in a regular situation. The Respondent State refers to a 1993 judgment of the Supreme Constitutional Court where the Court held that the state of emergency, although an exceptional regime, is not equivalent to totalitarian rule. The Court had held that the (state of emergency) regime is 23