State responsibility This declaration is in accordance with the request made by Albania through her Counsel, and is in itself appropriate satisfaction.592 This has been followed in many subsequent cases.593 However, while the making of a declaration by a competent court or tribunal may be treated as a form of satisfaction in a given case, such declarations are not intrinsically associated with the remedy of satisfaction. Any court or tribunal which has jurisdiction over a dispute has the authority to determine the lawfulness of the conduct in question and to make a declaration of its findings, as a necessary part of the process of determining the case. Such a declaration may be a preliminary to a decision on any form of reparation, or it may be the only remedy sought. What the Court did in the Corfu Channel case was to use a declaration as a form of satisfaction in a case where Albania had sought no other form. Moreover, such a declaration has further advantages: it should be clear and self-contained and will by definition not exceed the scope or limits of satisfaction referred to in paragraph 3 of article 37. A judicial declaration is not listed in paragraph 2 only because it must emanate from a competent third party with jurisdiction over a dispute, and the articles are not concerned to specify such a party or to deal with issues of judicial jurisdiction. Instead, article 37 specifies the acknowledgement of the breach by the responsible State as a modality of satisfaction. (7) Another common form of satisfaction is an apology, which may be given verbally or in writing by an appropriate official or even the Head of State. Expressions of regret or apologies were required in the “I’m Alone”,594 Kellett595 and “Rainbow Warrior”596 cases, and were offered by the responsible State in the Consular Relations597 and LaGrand598 cases. Requests for, or offers of, an apology are a quite frequent feature of diplomatic practice and the tender of a timely apology, where the circumstances justify it, can do much to resolve a dispute. In other circumstances an apology may not be called for, e.g. where a case is settled on an ex gratia basis, or it may be insufficient. In the LaGrand case the Court considered that “an apology is not sufficient in this case, as it would not be in other cases where foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of their rights under article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have been subjected to prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties”.599 592 Corfu Channel, Merits (see footnote 35 above), p. 35, repeated in the operative part (p. 36). 593 For example, “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), p. 273, para. 123. 594 See footnote 590 above. 595 Moore, Digest, vol. V, p. 44 (1897). 596 See footnote 46 above. 597 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 248. For the text of the United States’ apology, see United States Department of State, Text of Statement Released in Asunción, Paraguay; Press statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, 4 November 1998. For the order discontinuing proceedings of 10 November 1998, see I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 426. 598 See footnote 119 above. 599 LaGrand, Merits (ibid.), para. 123. 107 (8) Excessive demands made under the guise of “satisfaction” in the past600 suggest the need to impose some limit on the measures that can be sought by way of satisfaction to prevent abuses, inconsistent with the principle of the equality of States.601 In particular, satisfaction is not intended to be punitive in character, nor does it include punitive damages. Paragraph 3 of article 37 places limitations on the obligation to give satisfaction by setting out two criteria: first, the proportionality of satisfaction to the injury; and secondly, the requirement that satisfaction should not be humiliating to the responsible State. It is true that the term “humiliating” is imprecise, but there are certainly historical examples of demands of this kind. Article 38. Interest 1. Interest on any principal sum due under this chapter shall be payable when necessary in order to ensure full reparation. The interest rate and mode of calculation shall be set so as to achieve that result. 2. Interest runs from the date when the principal sum should have been paid until the date the obligation to pay is fulfilled. Commentary (1) Interest is not an autonomous form of reparation, nor is it a necessary part of compensation in every case. For this reason the term “principal sum” is used in article 38 rather than “compensation”. Nevertheless, an award of interest may be required in some cases in order to provide full reparation for the injury caused by an internationally wrongful act, and it is normally the subject of separate treatment in claims for reparation and in the awards of tribunals. (2) As a general principle, an injured State is entitled to interest on the principal sum representing its loss, if that sum is quantified as at an earlier date than the date of the settlement of, or judgement or award concerning, the claim and to the extent that it is necessary to ensure full reparation.602 Support for a general rule favouring the award of interest as an aspect of full reparation is found in international jurisprudence.603 In the S.S. “Wimbledon”, PCIJ awarded simple interest at 6 per cent as from the date of judgment, on the basis that interest was only payable “from the moment when the amount of the sum due 600 For example, the joint note presented to the Chinese Government in 1900 following the Boxer uprising and the demand by the Conference of Ambassadors against Greece in the Tellini affair in 1923: see C. Eagleton, op. cit. (footnote 582 above), pp. 187–188. 601 The need to prevent the abuse of satisfaction was stressed by early writers such as J. C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt, 3rd ed. (Nördlingen, Beck, 1878); French translation by M. C. Lardy, Le droit international codifié, 5th rev. ed. (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1895), pp. 268–269. 602 Thus, interest may not be allowed where the loss is assessed in current value terms as at the date of the award. See the Lighthouses arbitration (footnote 182 above), pp. 252–253. 603 See, e.g., the awards of interest made in the Illinois Central Railroad Co. (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States case, UNRIAA, vol. IV (Sales No. 1951.V.1), p. 134 (1926); and the Lucas case, ILR, vol. 30, p. 220 (1966); see also administrative decision No. III of the United States-Germany Mixed Claims Commission, UNRIAA, vol. VII (Sales No. 1956.V.5), p. 66 (1923).